Justice Divided, Justice Denied?
The Effects of Court Rules on Eviction Outcomes in Los Angeles County*

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Abstract

More than 40,000 households in Los Angeles County face eviction each year. Pursuing policies that reduce the number of evictions is of growing importance to state and local policymakers, but the causes and consequences of eviction are poorly understood. By collecting eviction docket records and linking them to administrative data, we are able to study an important institutional determinant of eviction in LA County: how courts assign cases. Because eviction cases are assigned to courthouses based on a unique spatial assignment rule, we test the effect of court assignment on default eviction probability using a regression discontinuity design. We show that courthouse assignment can increase the probability of default eviction by 0.05–13.34 percentage points. Estimates are robust to some model specifications and sensitive to others. Finally, we implement a spatial boundary segment mechanism model to disentangle the effects of two causal mechanisms: tenant costs and court procedure. Using outcome and mechanism variation across boundary segments, we find small local effects of tenant costs and court procedure on default outcomes but also a high degree of specification uncertainty. Additional studies may more definitively isolate eviction mechanisms.

Keywords: eviction, court rules, regression discontinuity, empirical legal studies

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1 Introduction

Landlords file more than 40,000 eviction cases against renter households each year in Los Angeles County (Dillon, Castleman, and Esquivel, 2023). The leading reason is non-payment of rent. In most LA neighborhoods, more than 90% of eviction notices are issued for non-payment of rent. Once filed, most cases end in eviction via a default judgment, where the court orders the tenant(s) to vacate the property and, if relevant, pay the landlord any unpaid rent. For tenants, the repercussions are increased housing instability, reduced earnings, reduced credit access, and increased hospital visits (Collinson et al., 2024).

With the expiration of COVID-19 eviction protections, state and local policymakers are increasingly exploring interventions to decrease eviction filings and keep tenants housed. California Gov. Gavin Newsom, for example, signed housing reforms in 2023 aimed at decreasing the number of evictions.[1] Local jurisdictions across the state have gradually begun to adopt more stringent tenant protections too. In the City of Los Angeles, Mayor Karen Bass has extended rent relief programs, stating: "We will do all we can to ensure that a wave of evictions does not hit our City as we continue confronting the homelessness crisis."[2]

Despite policymaker interest, the causes of eviction are not well-understood. Part of the problem is that data on California evictions is scarce and difficult to obtain, which has prevented researchers from fully identifying institutional mechanisms linking eviction filings with eviction case outcomes. This paper assembles the most comprehensive data on LA County evictions to-date. Our primary dataset for this paper consists of over 60,000 individual case docket records, which we use to better understand individual tenant outcomes, link to additional administrative data (e.g. assessor data), and isolate descriptive trends in LA County eviction cases. The docket records are used, for instance, to extract institutional details on the practice of eviction across LA County courthouses, including information on time-to-default, monetary judgments, total case times, and dozens of binary procedural variables (extracted via regular expressions). Additional institutional context (hearing times, parking fees, COVID-19 era moratoria, case misfiling) is also documented in the Appendices and incorporated into the analysis where possible.[3]

[1] For media coverage, see Wiley (2023).

[2] Mayor (2023).

[3] For example, we use case time and money judgment to test for robustness as additional outcomes in our RDD design. Institutional details on parking fees, case hearing times, etc. are used to obtain a new measure of the tenant cost of getting to court in monetary terms (i.e. "generalized costs").

Using this novel data, we next study court assignment as an institutional determinant of eviction via default judgment in LA County. Default evictions occur when tenants fail to appear at court and lose *by default.* We quantify how the court assignment mechanism impacts the eviction default probability. Because LA County eviction cases are assigned to courthouses based on a unique spatial assignment rule, we are able to estimate the causal effect of courthouse assignment on default probability using a regression discontinuity design. The discontinuity design allows us to compare cases located across a courthouse boundary that are likely to be similar along unobservable dimensions.

For renters near a courthouse boundary, the paper shows that court assignment affects the eviction default probability. Our estimates for the local average treatment effect (LATE) of courthouse assignment range from 0.05–13.3 percentage points for seven different courthouse pairs. For example, for renters near the Santa Monica & Stanley Mosk courthouse boundary, the average treatment effect of being assigned to the Santa Monica courthouse is a 2.89 percentage point increase in the probability of default versus the Stanley Mosk courthouse. Implementing a variety of robustness checks and estimating additional outcome treatment effects at the boundary, however, we find both robustness and sensitivity to certain specifications.

To further isolate the causes of eviction defaults, we specify and estimate a spatial boundary mechanism model to determine how two mechanisms impact default probability. Specifically, we test how tenant costs[4] of getting to court and court procedures impact eviction default outcomes using boundary segment variation in local mechanism and outcome discontinuities. The impact of various design and estimation decisions in the "garden of forking paths" (Gelman and Loken, 2013) are explored, including varying: outcome measures, procedure measures, tenant cost measures, first-stage estimation procedure, bandwidth selection, the number of boundary segments, and other modeling choices.

Using many model specifications, we show that mechanism estimates are subject to specification, measurement, and estimation uncertainty. Nevertheless, we find model average and model median estimates of the effect of tenant costs (proxied by distance-to-court or measured in general monetary costs) to be small in standardized terms, although the sign of the effect is not consistent across models. Estimates of procedural effects are even more uncertain (wider model estimate interquartile ranges). In some

[4]As Prescott (2017) writes: "[T]he inability to access justice is rooted in something more physical, more mundane: the many and varied costs of getting to and physically using a brick-and-mortar courthouse."

cases average and median effect estimates align with the extant literature, however, the average and median effect sizes are small in general. Model estimates for each courthouse pair under various specification settings are provided and discussed.

Further studies or additional data may more precisely estimate the most important causal mechanisms determining eviction outcomes. Our work highlights some limitations, however, with using observational data to isolate causal mechanisms, showing that such studies face many specification choices that can change the magnitude and direction of mechanism effect estimates. The spatial boundary mechanism model here, nevertheless, may be useful in exploring how variation in outcomes and mechanisms along different boundary segments may identify mechanism coefficient effects in some settings under certain causal assumptions.

Our analysis informs ongoing policy debates. Typically, interest groups propose eviction reforms to give tenants more resources. For example, some tenant advocates[5] endorse civil *Gideon*,[6] a right-to-counsel intervention. But providing tenants with legal representation in eviction court is costly. By contrast, this paper is concerned with institutional policy reforms. We show how courthouse assignment is an important institution with a disparate impact on tenants across courthouse boundaries. Because LA County has 23 active courthouses (including six[7] that previously heard eviction cases post-2010), policymakers can modify the courthouse assignment rule to minimize the cost of getting to court.[8]

1.1 Prior Literature

This paper is related to a growing eviction literature, that includes work in fields like sociology, law, urban planning, and public policy. Research from the Eviction Lab (Desmond, 2017), for example, discusses the demographic correlates of eviction, suggesting that defaults are randomly distributed.[9] In LA County, by contrast, Lens, Nelson, and Gromis (2020) and Nelson et al. (2021) demonstrate the importance of neighborhoods, housing markets, and spatial clustering to understanding eviction dynamics (the "geography of risk") in metropolitan areas. Larson (2006) similarly shows that case characteristics and neighborhood-level covariates are important deter-

[5] See, e.g., Baird (2021).

[6] The proposal is a reference to *Gideon v. Wainwright* (1963), the landmark Supreme Court decision requiring states to provide defense counsel to indigent criminal defendants.

[7] Previous Eviction Courthouses (with year last heard eviction cases): Alhambra (2013), Beverly Hills (2012), Burbank (2013), Glendale (2013), Pomona (2017), Torrance (2013).

[8] We leave the optimal eviction courthouse assignment policy for future work.

[9] See Desmond (2017) p. 358, n. 5.

minants of a prevalent eviction outcome: default. This literature informs our research design. Intuitively, the regression discontinuity design disentangles correlation from causation by comparing cases located nearby so that observable and unobservable characteristics are similar across the courthouse boundary.

We also contribute to a nascent but growing literature on the causal determinants of eviction outcomes. Our work is related to Hoffman and Strezhnev (2023), who study the spatial determinants of Philadelphia evictions. Studying over 200,000 eviction cases in Philadelphia from 2005–2021, the authors use a selection-on-observables strategy with a variety of fixed effects to show that "a one hour increase in estimated travel time increases the probability of default by between 3.9 to 8.6 percentage points across different model specifications." In New York City and Chicago, Collinson et al. (2024) study the consequences of eviction using detailed administrative data. Using a judge-leniency design ("Judge IV"), the authors show that eviction increases homelessness, reduces earnings, and negatively impacts credit access.

Our work adds to this causal determinants of eviction literature by incorporating a regression discontinuity design in a sprawling Western city. This is important for two reasons. First, the quasi-experimental regression discontinuity design is said to have high degrees of internal validity (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Second, it is important to study Western cities that differ in important ways from Philadelphia, NYC, and Chicago to test the generalizability of prior work. LA County may better represent Sunbelt cities in terms of spatial distribution of cases, transit infrastructure, commute time, etc. than other large cities. Moreover, the assignment process in LA County differs in significant respects from assignment in these three best-studied cities: for example, cases in Philadelphia are assigned to a single courthouse located at the intersection of the city's two primary public transit lines.[10] By contrast, LA County cases are assigned to 1 of 11 courthouses by a unique neighborhood-zip code scheme. Like Hoffman and Strezhnev (2023), we show that distance does matter in LA County, although there is important geographic heterogeneity.

Finally, we contribute to the law and economics literature on proximity or access to court. Prescott (2017), for example, studies how the introduction of dispute resolution platforms impacted case times and case default rates. Like Prescott (2017), we show

[10]Cook County cases are heard at six different courthouses, although Chicago cases are heard downtown at the Daley Center. The suburban cases are assigned to one of the five suburban courthouse districts. The cities assigned to each district are listed at https://www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org/divisions/suburban-districts-0. In New York City, eviction cases occur in seven courthouses determined either by County (Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, Richmond) or two special eviction courthouses (Harlem and Red Hook).

physical space affects case default rates.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional details necessary to understand eviction in Los Angeles County.[11] Section 3 describes the collected data, defines the outcome-of-interest, and documents descriptive findings. Section 4 describes the regression discontinuity design and results, including: identification, estimation, and local average treatment effects (LATEs). Section 5 specifies a spatial boundary segment mechanism model and estimates the effect of two potential causal mechanisms affecting eviction outcomes: tenant costs (proxied by distance-to-court or generalized monetary costs) and court procedures. Section 6 concludes. Further details can be found in the Appendices on data sources and collection, data cleaning, record linkage, descriptive findings, and other details.

2 Institutional Background

Although previous studies on eviction have focused on major metropolitan areas such as NYC and Chicago, fewer academic works concern evictions in California cities. Despite the consistently high volume[12] of eviction filings and policymaker concern, it is difficult to address CA eviction problems because empirical work is hampered by data availability problems. California counties do not uniformly record or report the number of cases filed by different types (e.g. eviction, small claims, and unlimited civil jurisdiction). The statewide eviction record sealing law is another obstacle. Under CA law, many eviction records are sealed to the public unless certain conditions are met.[13] Simplifying, eviction records are sealed unless the landlord prevails at trial or the case ends in a default judgment against the tenant.

Due to these reporting and sealing issues, we study a particular eviction outcome: eviction via default judgment. Defaults can occur at two time points in an eviction lawsuit: first, if tenants do not file an Answer before the court-mandated deadline, and second, if tenants do not appear at an assigned court date. While the latter type is relatively rare, both types of default result in landlords winning and tenants losing their cases, oftentimes before their first court date. Because defaults are difficult to

[11]Certain institutional details cannot be treated fully here. We describe only the eviction details necessary to contextualize our identification strategy and interpret the results. For a more complete treatment of LA County eviction, including historical details, see Nelson (2023).

[12]See the Eviction Lab estimates in the top left panel of Appendix Figure F1. The Eviction Lab-modeled estimates also show that LA filings constitute a roughly constant proportion of total statewide filings from 2000–2018.

[13]See California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1161.2, 1167.1.

reverse, filing an Answer and attending eviction court dates are imperative.

There exist a myriad of obstacles, however, to getting to court. As argued most relevantly by tenants-plaintiffs in *Miles v. Wesley*, 801 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015):

> [R]educing the number of courthouses handling unlawful detainer cases disproportionately impacts poor, disabled, and minority residents. ... [B]ecause individuals with disabilities and minorities are disproportionately renters who rely on public transportation, the closure of these courtrooms would have a disparate impact on these communities. [T]he importance of neighborhood court access is heightened in light of the expedited timeline of unlawful detainer actions, the fact that most low-income tenants are not represented by counsel, and the prospect that a default judgment could render a tenant homeless.

In response to *Miles*, the LA Superior Court system expanded the number of regional courthouses that process eviction cases, but many of the distance concerns cited in *Miles* continue to exist. Hoffman and Strezhnev (2023) supports the anecdotal evidence in *Miles*, showing that longer travel times made tenants in Philadelphia, PA and Harris County, TX more likely to default than tenants with shorter travel times. The authors find that this "transit effect" disappeared when courts made virtual accommodations in eviction proceedings during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This growing literature focuses primarily on structural factors that shape the likelihood of tenants defaulting. To the extent that this research identifies institutional determinants of default, it focuses on COVID-19 era adaptations, rather than eviction case policies in less exceptional times. By contrast, our paper is the first to empirically assess how the idiosyncratic institutional process of court assignment (specifically, assigning eviction cases to regional courtrooms within a broader countywide court system) affects the likelihood of tenant default.

To do so, we collected comprehensive data on monthly eviction filings in LA County.[14] The top right panel of Appendix Figure F1 shows the LA County filing volume data we collected via California Public Records Act (CPRA) requests to the LA Superior Courts (LASC). Our filing data augments the Eviction Lab Data (Appendix Figure F1 top left panel) with exact filing volumes since 2000 and emphasizes the inclusion of 2019–2023 filings. Although eviction filings were low in 2020–2022 due to temporary eviction protections at the local, state, and federal levels, the number of

[14] Trends plotted in Appendix F.

eviction filings in 2023 exceeded the number of pre-pandemic filings in the 2017–2019 years.

During the same period, the time to complete an eviction case has been increasing. In the bottom panel of Appendix Figure F1, the percentage of CA eviction cases disposed in 30 or 45 days decreased from 2014–2023. Eviction is a summary proceeding, but only 35% of the California evictions filed in 2023 were completed within 45 days. In Appendix C and Appendix D, we show that LA County also experiences longer disposition and total case times.

In sum, LA County evictions are increasing in volume, take longer to complete, and are difficult to address due to lack of reliable empirical information for policymakers, legal officials, and researchers. This paper is the first to look at the relationship between institutional processes and default outcomes and represents the most comprehensive empirical description and causal analysis of how the LA County eviction process impacts eviction outcomes to-date. The remainder of Section 2 describes the LA County eviction system: Section 2.1 describes the eviction process; and Section 2.2 explains how eviction cases are assigned to different eviction courthouses.

2.1 Eviction Process

The eviction process begins when a landlord serves an eviction notice on a tenant. The vast majority of eviction notices are for unpaid rent: for example, in LA City, over 96% of the notices in 2023 were for non-payment of rent. Eviction notices typically give tenants 3 days (91% of eviction notices in LA City) to "cure" their lease breach by paying unpaid rent to the landlord. The amount of unpaid rent and number of eviction notices vary at the zip-code and building levels.[15]

Next, the landlord initiates an eviction proceeding by filing an eviction lawsuit in the LA Superior Court system, which costs \$240-\$385.[16] After being notified of an eviction proceeding initiated against them,[17] tenants must file an Answer within 5 days (pre-2025)[18] with the court.[19] The filing fee for the tenant's Answer has varied

[15]See Nelson et al. (2021) for discussion of the spatial autocorrelation in eviction variables.

[16]See nos. 11 and 14 in LASC (2024).

[17]Tenants are considered notified after being served the Summons and Complaint forms.

[18]The five days do not include weekends or holidays. Additionally, tenants may have longer to respond if they are improperly served. But see Assembly Bill 2347, which as of Jan 2025 gives tenants 10 days to respond.

[19]The tenant is not supposed to mail the Answer, as they will default if the Answer doesn't arrive. The official self-help page for California Courts strongly recommends against mailing the Answer, and instead says you should show up to file the Answer at the relevant court. See https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/eviction-tenant/respond-file.

over time, but the 2024 fee in eviction actions where the contested amount of rent is less than $\$12,500$ is $\$225$.[20]

If tenants do not file an Answer by the court-mandated deadline, landlords may petition the court to enter a default judgment against the tenant. Otherwise, after an Answer is filed, the court sets a trial date. Tenants who do not appear at trial will also receive a default judgment, but if they appear there is a judgment on the merits.[21] The judgment typically awards landlords any past due rent.

Following the court-issued judgment, the landlord may enforce the judgment by obtaining a writ of execution. The writ gives the sheriff permission to lock the tenant out of the premises. After obtaining the writ, the sheriff will serve the tenant a Notice to Vacate, which gives the tenant five days to move out. Five days after receipt of the Notice to Vacate, the sheriff will change the locks, forcing the tenant out of the residence. The typical process is represented graphically below in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Eviction Timeline (Simplified)

This is a stylized timeline of events, which may not reflect the exact process for every eviction.[22] In particular, eviction moratoria and other COVID-19 protections altered

[20] See no. 15 in LASC (2024). But note that there are fee waiver applications available.

[21] As explained in Engstrom et al. (Apr. 3, 2025), "tenants face high costs to participation: short response timelines, the need to make last-minute requests for time off work, high answer fees, and scarcity of low-fee legal help services. These costs influence whether a tenant chooses to participate in their case—even if they disagree on the merits." Nevertheless, benefits to court attendance may include reduced judgment amounts, additional time to move-out, or further bargaining gains. High tenant costs and low win probability, moreover, do not necessarily produce an eviction court paradox: as in the voting paradox literature (see, e.g., Riker and Ordeshook (1968)), probability-independent (i.e. non-instrumental) benefits from access, participation, and engaging in the legal process may influence tenant attendance decisions.

[22] The eviction timeline outlined above omits, for instance, any special motions that may arise.

the 2020–2022 process, e.g., giving tenants more time or limiting the landlord's ability to force the tenant to vacate. We document, moreover, in Appendix C and Appendix D that LA County time-to-disposition and total case times have recently increased, similarly to the statewide trends in Appendix Figure F1.

2.2 Courthouse Assignment Rule: Map & History

According to LASC Local Rule 2.3(a)(2), eviction cases are assigned to courthouses based on a unique spatial mechanism. Under that rule, unlawful detainer actions:

> "must be filed in the courthouse serving the location and proper United States Postal Service zip code of the property in dispute using the Zip Code Table for Unlawful Detainer cases."

The eleven courthouses where eviction cases are filed include: Chatsworth, Compton, Governor George Deukmejian (Long Beach), Inglewood, Michael Antonovich Antelope Valley, Norwalk, Pasadena, Santa Monica, Stanley Mosk, Van Nuys East, and West Covina. Table 1 below illustrates how the courthouse assignment procedure works for the first few zip codes in Los Angeles County.

Table 1. Zip Code Table for Unlawful Detainer Cases

Zip Code	City/Neighborhood	Modifier	Courthouse
90001	FLORENCE		Stanley Mosk
90001	HUNTINGTON PARK		Norwalk
90001	LOS ANGELES		Stanley Mosk
90002	FLORENCE		Compton
90002	LOS ANGELES		Compton
90002	LYNWOOD		Norwalk
90002	WATTS		Compton
90003	LOS ANGELES	North of Manchester	Stanley Mosk
90003	LOS ANGELES	South of Manchester	Compton
90004	LOS ANGELES		Stanley Mosk

Generally, the city-zip code pairs completely determine the assigned courthouse. However, in some zip codes the assignment is further determined relative to a particular street. For example, in Table 1 above, eviction cases arising in the 90003 zip code are assigned to the Stanley Mosk or Compton Courthouse if the tenant's address is north or south of Manchester Avenue, respectively. The full assignment map for LA County is given below in the left panel of Figure 2.



Figure 2. Courthouse Assignment

Note: The left panel shows the courthouse districts from 2017-2023, found by aggregating the units from the Simplified Zip Code Table (Appendix Table A2). The right panel is the number of eviction courts from 2009-2024. The Catalina Courthouse is omitted from the left panel map and the analysis. In the right panel, LASC data has been collected for the shaded gray years within the dashed purple boxes. Note that 2020–2022 eviction data is unobserved due to local, state, and federal eviction moratoria.

Over time, the number of courthouses that hear eviction cases in LA County has fluctuated. As seen in the right panel of Figure 2 above, the number of courthouses that hear eviction cases has ranged between a low of five courthouses (2014) and a high of twenty-six courthouses (2009-2011). This paper focuses on the full years with 11 courthouses (2018–2024), which is the long horizontal line in the right panel of Figure 2.[23] See Appendix A for more details on assignment.

3 Data and Outcomes

This section describes the data collection, cleaning, and linking (inc. geocoding) processes. We also define the main outcome-of-interest (default eviction) and briefly note how the data can be used to document descriptive trends in eviction cases.

[23]We focus on the primary 11 courthouses, although technically the Catalina Courthouse also hears eviction cases for Santa Catalina Island. Unless otherwise stated, we generally do not consider this court because it has no observed evictions. We therefore omit it from the Figure 2 plots.

3.1 Docket Records: Geocoding & Assessor Linkage

The first and most important dataset we collected for this paper includes tens of thousands of individual docket records in eviction cases scraped from the LA Superior Courts from 2016-2023.[24] From the individual-level text files containing all publicly-available docket information, we use regular expression (regex) to extract detailed information for each individual case, including the following covariates: landlords (plaintiffs), tenants (defendants), attorneys (if applicable), address information, monetary awards, judge, courthouse, and dynamic case timing information. Particularly important is the address information, which includes the full address (i.e. street number, street, city, state, zip code) for the majority of cases across years.

Using the individual-level case address information, we then geocoded each address using the Mapbox API. The Mapbox API returns probabilistic matches with a matched address, latitude/longitude, and the match "confidence" score. In the analyses that follow, we consider only cases for which the Mapbox API returns a "High" or "Exact" match for the address we extracted from the individual docket records.

Using the geocoded addresses, we then linked our eviction dataset to information from the LA County Assessors Office. This gives us building-level covariates for each address and includes, for example, the age of the building, the number of units, and number of bathrooms. Many of these covariates serve as important proxies for tenant income or tenant rent, which are generally unobservable. Note that, for each year, we use assessor data on the number of units in a building to infer the number of units in that building for which we do *not* observe default for one of our outcome measures (imputed unit defaults outcome).

See Appendix B for more details on data collection, including information on the case availability, the FOIA data on the total number of evictions in a courthouse each month, sampling rates in Appendix Figure B1, geocoding information in Appendix Figure B2, and Appendix H for discussion of misfiling.

3.2 Outcome: Eviction Default

The main outcome of interest in this paper is eviction default. Using the docket and assessment data, we measure the number of eviction defaults each year at each address. The primary outcome is a binary variable that reflects whether we observe

[24] Unless otherwise noted, we exclude 2020-2022 from all analysis and discussion because of local, state, and national eviction moratoria. Moratoria are further described in Appendix B.

a rental unit i experience an eviction default:[25]

$$\text{eviction}_i = \mathbf{1}\{\text{unit } i \text{ is evicted via default}\}$$

We impute non-default status to apartment units in a building each year t ($t \in 2018, 2019, 2023, 2024$) without an observed default and pool across years to create our analysis dataset. In the robustness checks, we discuss an alternative way of using the docket record data that does not involve imputing zeroes to unobserved apartment units.

In the analysis that follows, we also make additional restrictions on the docket records used. To avoid biases from geocoding, we first restrict the data to records with "high" or "exact" confidence matches from the Mapbox API. We also restrict analysis to residential case types with "default" status in the years 2018, 2019, 2023, and 2024. As discussed above, the year restriction is to only use full years with scraped cases under the current filing rule (which went into effect in Late 2017). Finally, note also that we focus on the sub-population of buildings that have at least one observed eviction (2018–2024). Other buildings that appear in the LA County assessor data but do not match an address in the scraped eviction data are excluded: assessed properties for which we do not observe an eviction may differ from properties with evictions in important but unobservable respects, including being unoccupied or unavailable to rent.

3.3 Docket Records: Descriptive Findings

The docket records are useful for empirically assessing eviction trends. For example, the data can be used to assess eviction case time trends (time-to-default or total case time), money judgment trends, or case misfiling rates. In Appendix C and Appendix D, we show time-to-default and total case time are higher post-pandemic. This is consistent with the statewide trend toward longer case timelines, shown in the bottom panel of Appendix Figure F1. We also document misfilings, where cases are heard in a courthouse different from the assignment rule courthouse. We do not find evidence that this is attributable to strategic landlord behavior in Appendix H.

[25]Note that the binary nature of this outcome will allow us to interpret the conditional expectation $\mathbb{E}[\text{eviction}_i | X_i = x]$ as the yearly probability of default eviction for units i that are x distance from the courthouse district boundary conditional on being an address with at least one rental unit with eviction default.

4 Regression Discontinuity Design: Methods & Results

This section explains our regression discontinuity design (RDD), which exploits variation stemming from the discontinuous assignment of cases to courthouses based on spatial location. We present results estimating the local average treatment effect (LATE) for seven different courthouse pairs across LA County.

4.1 Continuity-Based Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design

In what follows, we consider the “sharp” regression discontinuity design under continuity assumptions.

4.1.1 Setup & Identification

To begin, we assume a potential outcomes framework. Let Y_{0i} and Y_{1i} be the counterfactual outcomes for an individual i without and with treatment, respectively. Let the “forcing variable” be X_i be the distance to the boundary C. The binary treatment W_i is determined as follows:

$$W_i = \mathbf{1}\{X_i \geq C\}$$

The observed outcome is:

$$Y_i = (1 - W_i)Y_{0i} + W_iY_{1i}$$

Define further the counterfactual conditional expectation functions (CEF):

$$\mu_g(x) = \mathbb{E}[Y_g|X = x]$$

for $g = 0, 1$. In the regression discontinuity design, the potential outcome CEFs are assumed continuous in the forcing variable X. Because W_i is a deterministic function of X_i note that ignorability (conditional mean independence) holds:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_g|X, W] = \mathbb{E}[Y_g|X]$$

for $g = 0, 1$.

The estimand of interest in a sharp RDD is the treatment effect at the cutoff, or the local average treatment effect (LATE), defined as:

$$\tau_C = \mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0|X = C]$$

In our empirical setting, we have a treatment effect for each pair of courthouse districts that share a boundary C. That is, for each pair of courthouse districts, we define treatment $W_i = 1$ if unit i is in the first courthouse district and $W_i = 0$ if unit i lies in the other courthouse district. For example, when comparing buildings near the Pasadena and West Covina courthouse boundary, we set $W_i = 1$ if unit i is assigned to the Pasadena courthouse and $W_i = 0$ if assigned to the West Covina courthouse.

Under these assumptions, the LATE is identified by the limits of the observable CEFs:

$$\tau_C = \lim_{x \to C^+} \mathbb{E}[Y|X = x] - \lim_{x \to C^-} \mathbb{E}[Y|X = x]$$

4.1.2 Estimation & Inference

Estimating the limits that identify the causal estimands above is usually accomplished non-parametrically. Below, we use the local linear estimator with uniform kernel as in Imbens and Lemieux (2008). These estimates are given by obtaining linear fits locally, i.e. within some bandwidth h_x on either side of the cutoff C:

$$\min_{\alpha_l, \beta_l} \sum_{i: X_i \in (C - h_x, C)} (Y_i - \alpha_l - \beta_l(X_i - C))^2 \quad \text{and} \quad \min_{\alpha_r, \beta_r} \sum_{i: X_i \in [C, C + h_x)} (Y_i - \alpha_r - \beta_r(X_i - C))^2$$

For each courthouse pair, we then estimate τ_C as:

$$\hat{\tau}_C = \hat{\alpha}_r - \hat{\alpha}_l$$

An important consideration here is the bandwidth selection procedure. We present the LATE estimates for many possible bandwidth choices up to some distance from the boundary (e.g. up to 5km from the boundary). We also give the robust point estimates and CIs from the bandwidth selection procedure used by the `rdrobust` package (Calonico et al., 2023).

4.2 Estimating the LATEs

For each courthouse pair, we begin by considering only cases close to the boundary. To estimate the LATE at the courthouse boundaries, we consider only cases within a 5km buffer zone around the boundary. The cases we consider for Pasadena and West Covina, for instance, are shown in Figure 3. Buildings with observed defaults within 5km of the boundary are plotted in the left panel, with Pasadena defaults in red and West Covina defaults in blue. The location of the courthouses are also labeled as large points. The Pasadena courthouse is further from near-boundary evictions than the West Covina courthouse, which is visually shown in the left panel map and confirmed in the right panel histograms. The right panel histograms show the distance-to-court that cases within the 5km boundary buffer face in getting to court.



Figure 3. Pasadena & West Covina Map
Note: The left panel plots the boundary between Pasadena (red region) and West Covina (blue region) eviction districts. The eviction boundary is the solid yellow line, and cases within a 5km buffer (dashed yellow lines) are plotted as points: Pasadena evictions shown in red and West Covina evictions are shown in blue. The large labeled points are the Pasadena and West Covina courthouses. The right panel shows distance-to-court histograms for these eviction cases, with the Pasadena histogram in red and the West Covina histogram in blue.

Using these cases, we estimate local average treatment effects (LATEs)

$$\tau_C = \mathbb{E}(Y_1 - Y_0 | X = C)$$

at different boundaries C for the courthouse pairs below. In Figure 4, we report the LATE estimates from the robust bandwidth selection procedure in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) using companion software Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2015) in the lower-right table. The courthouse pair plots show default probabilities as a function of distance to the boundary, with two lines of fit on each side of the boundary: a linear fit (dashed lines) and quartic fit (solid lines).

The estimated fits (within 5km of each boundary) are plotted by courthouse pair and `rdrobust` estimates are provided in the lower-right table in Figure 4. The absolute robust LATE estimates range from 0.05–13.3 percentage points. In two courthouse pairs, the robust LATE estimate is not significant: Chatsworth & Van Nuys and Pasadena & Stanley Mosk. In the remaining pairs, the robust LATE estimate is significant but varies in size. The smallest significant effect is 2.70 percentage points (Compton & Stanley Mosk), whereas the largest significant effect is -13.34 percentage points (Pasadena & Stanley Mosk).

Because eviction records are incomplete legal documents, they do not contain all relevant individual information on landlords and tenants. Nevertheless, using a variety of building-level, neighborhood-level, and individual-level data we assess the plausibility of the causal identifying continuity assumption on pre-determined covariates near the boundary of each courthouse pair. Building-level data (total value and taxable value) comes from LA County Assessor property records, demographic covariates (gender, race, median income, rent) are imputed to each record using census tract Census/ACS variables, and additional demographic (predicted race, predicted gender) and representation covariates are estimated using the docket records and regular expressions.

We show covariate continuity tests (estimated by `rdrobust`) for each courthouse pair boundary in Appendix I. Some courthouse pairs satisfy most of the continuity checks, with no significant treatment effects in many pre-determined covariates (robust p-values included in final columns of each courthouse pair table). In the Pasadena and West Covina pair, for example, we find no demographic (ACS-imputed or predicted), imputed income/rent, or representation continuity violations, although the Assessor property values are discontinuous. Some continuity test violations across the entire courthouse boundary may be spatial in nature, given that we are using cases across the entire courthouse pair boundary. Further tests localized to spatial boundary segments may be performed where more data are available, and we incorporate covariate balance conditions into the mechanism model that follows where possible. In other words, we include models in the mechanism estimation section that condition on covariate balance at spatial segments along the boundary, which may be expected to improve counterfactual comparisons. Further details are contained in Appendix I.



Courthouse Pair	LATE Estimate	CI Lower	CI Upper
Chatsworth & Van Nuys East	0.0005	−0.0050	0.0059
Compton & Norwalk	0.0412	0.0191	0.0634
Compton & Stanley Mosk	0.0270	0.0088	0.0451
Inglewood & Long Beach	−0.1334	−0.1837	−0.0832
Pasadena & Stanley Mosk	0.0072	−0.0081	0.0224
Pasadena & West Covina	0.0850	0.0432	0.1267
Santa Monica & Stanley Mosk	0.0289	0.0211	0.0366

Figure 4. LATE Estimates by Courthouse Pair (`rdrobust`)

Note: The LATE estimates ($\hat{\tau}_C$) at each courthouse pair boundary using the optimal bandwidth selection procedure in the `rdrobust` package (Calonico et al., 2023). The default quartic polynomial (solid line) and linear (dashed line) fits are plotted for each courthouse separately. The gray points are evenly-spaced binned means using the `rdplot`() function. The robust point estimates are reported (with robust CIs) in the table for each courthouse pair.

4.3 Robustness Checks

Next, we test the sensitivity of the default LATE estimates to various specification, design, and encoding decisions. The estimates from alternative specifications discussed here are included in Table 2.

Baseline. The first column in the robustness check Table 2 are the baseline specification results reported above, which are reproduced here for comparison purposes. We augment those estimates here with p-values and Bonferroni corrected p-values to account for testing seven courthouse pairs.

Non-Answers Only. The second column of Table 2 considers docket records without a recorded answer only. Defaults with and without a recorded answer may differ in important ways, yet many of the LATE treatment effect estimates are similar whether we consider only non-answer defaults or all defaults. For example, estimates from the Compton and Norwalk, Inglewood and Long Beach, and Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk comparisons remain significant (even with a Bonferroni correction) and of similar magnitude as the Baseline specification in Column (1).

Uniform Zip Codes Only. The third column of Table 2 subsets the data to zip codes with one assigned courthouse. As discussed in Appendix A, the filing rule encoding process from shapefiles and neighborhood boundaries may not be exact. Accordingly, in this specification we rely only on observations from zip codes where there is one unambiguous filing courthouse for all eviction cases within that zip code. In some cases, this does not appear to qualitatively change the LATE estimates: for example, the Compton and Norwalk and Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk point estimates from Column (3) are similar to the baseline specifications in Column (1). However, the zip code specification changes some estimates quite drastically, including one where the estimates lie outside the probability bounds (Inglewood and Long Beach) and some specifications where the sign of the estimate changes (e.g. Pasadena and Stanley Mosk comparison).

Assessor Match Quality. The fourth column of Table 2 subsets data to rows with higher quality Assessor match scores. Because we use the number of units in each apartment building and impute zeroes to units without observed defaults, this could bias estimates if the number of apartment units at an address is incorrectly matched from LA County Assessor data. The estimates are obtained from excluding cases where the Jaro-Winkler (JW) string similarity score, which measures differences between the observed address and the assessor address, falls below a threshold. The distribution of JW string similarity scores is shown in Appendix Figure J2.

Here, this results in some changes to the estimates. One estimate changes sign (Pasadena and Stanley Mosk) and one is no longer significant (Inglewood and Long Beach). On the other hand, certain courthouse pair estimates are similar directionally and in magnitude to the Baseline estimates, and they remain significant: for example, Compton and Norwalk, Pasadena and West Covina, and Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk estimates are similar in magnitude and remain significant.

Non-Imputed Outcomes/Case Default Flag. The fifth column tests whether non-default imputation to units in observed apartment buildings is meaningful. Instead of using all units in observed buildings, this specification uses all observed eviction docket records and flags cases with "default" status using regular expressions. Then, using only these records and no others, the records with default status are encoded as 1 and those without are encoded as 0, which does not require imputing zeroes to unobserved apartments in observed apartment buildings. It also changes the interpretation of the local treatment effect: the RDD estimates the effect of court assignment on default status among eviction docket records.

The estimates from these specifications are included in Column (5) of Table 2. Most estimates are not significant (five pairs) or change sign from the Baseline specification (one pair). The remaining pair (Copmton and Norwalk) is significant and directionally consistent, but suggests a larger effect: assignment to Compton courthouse increases default status by 12.6pp over assignment to Norwalk courthouse, versus the 4.1pp estimate from the imputed units Baseline specification.

Bandwidth Sensitivity. Finally, we test the sensitivity of the LATE estimates to the bandwidth. In Appendix Figure J1, we plot the local linear LATE estimates as a function of the specification bandwidth h_x. In a few cases, we see bandwidth-dependence in the magnitude and direction of the effect. For example, the magnitude and sign for the Inglewood and Long Beach LATE estimate as we decrease the bandwidth from 5000 meters to 0 meters changes sign a few times and magnitude near the `rdrobust` optimal bandwidth (vertical dashed black line). On the other hand, some of the LATE estimates are robust to the `rdrobust` selected bandwidth: for example, the Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk and Chatsworth and Van Nuys East LATE estimates are positive and roughly constant across bandwidths h_x.

RDD LATE Robustness Checks

	(1) Baseline	(2) Non-Answers	(3) Zips	(4) Assessor Match	(5) All Outcomes
Chatsworth and Van Nuys East					
Treatment Effect	0.000	0.001	-0.097	0.000	0.103
95% CI	(-0.005, 0.006)	(-0.003, 0.006)	(-0.137, -0.057)	(-0.008, 0.009)	(-0.004, 0.209)
p-value	0.864	0.602	0.000	0.972	0.058
Bonferroni p-value	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.408
Compton and Norwalk					
Treatment Effect	0.041	0.037	0.052	0.057	0.126
95% CI	(0.019, 0.063)	(0.015, 0.059)	(0.033, 0.072)	(0.029, 0.085)	(0.001, 0.250)
p-value	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.048
Bonferroni p-value	0.002	0.007	0.000	0.000	0.339
Compton and Stanley Mosk					
Treatment Effect	0.027	0.030	0.163	0.128	-0.020
95% CI	(0.009, 0.045)	(0.007, 0.054)	(0.147, 0.178)	(0.117, 0.140)	(-0.168, 0.127)
p-value	0.004	0.013	0.000	0.000	0.787
Bonferroni p-value	0.025	0.088	0.000	0.000	1.000
Inglewood and Long Beach					
Treatment Effect	-0.133	-0.133	1.592	-0.107	-0.191
95% CI	(-0.184, -0.083)	(-0.184, -0.083)	(0.643, 2.541)	(-0.529, 0.316)	(-0.421, 0.039)
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.621	0.104
Bonferroni p-value	0.000	0.000	0.007	1.000	0.728
Pasadena and Stanley Mosk					
Treatment Effect	0.007	-0.044	-0.040	-0.040	0.017
95% CI	(-0.008, 0.022)	(-0.054, -0.033)	(-0.052, -0.029)	(-0.050, -0.030)	(-0.064, 0.099)
p-value	0.356	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.676
Bonferroni p-value	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Pasadena and West Covina					
Treatment Effect	0.085	0.048	0.303	0.117	-0.005
95% CI	(0.043, 0.127)	(0.011, 0.085)	(0.152, 0.453)	(0.077, 0.157)	(-0.209, 0.200)
p-value	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.000	0.963
Bonferroni p-value	0.000	0.075	0.001	0.000	1.000
Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk					
Treatment Effect	0.029	0.031	0.058	0.030	-0.103
95% CI	(0.021, 0.037)	(0.024, 0.038)	(0.040, 0.075)	(0.023, 0.036)	(-0.181, -0.026)
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.009
Bonferroni p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.061

Table 2. RDD LATE Robustness Checks

Note: Column (1) is our baseline specification described in the previous section. Column (2) LATE estimates are for default outcomes without answers only. Column (3) LATE estimates consider only zip codes with unambiguous LASC filing rules. Column (4) LATE estimates are from subsetting the data to rows with high Assessor data match probabilities. Column (5) LATE estimates are from not imputing non-default outcomes to unobserved apartment units.

4.4 Additional Outcome Variables and LATE Estimates

Next, we include additional LATE estimates using further outcome variables. The effect of court assignment on the following case outcomes is estimated here: total case times, time-to-default (measured two ways, see), and total money judgment amounts. Unlike defaults, we do not have to rely on imputation to other apartment units to obtain variation in these outcome variables. Consequently, we are able to use only the observed docket records to estimate LATEs for these four outcomes.

Following the same estimation procedure, we obtain estimates of the effect of court assignment on these four outcomes in Appendix Table J1. For each of the seven courthouse pairs and four outcomes of interest, Appendix Table J1 gives the mean outcome for cases within the `rdrobust` selected bandwidth around the boundary. Means are measured in days for Columns (1)-(3) and dollars for Column (4). Robust treatment effect estimates, 95% confidence intervals, and p-values are also provided for each outcome and courthouse pair. Appendix Table J2 provide additional details and specifications, including: incorporating covariates (gender, race, income); Bonferroni corrected p-values; and other design information for each specification (e.g. bandwidths, number of observations).

In general, estimates for the additional outcome variables are insignificant. Although this could be due to smaller sample sizes around the boundaries, we find, for example, only two significant estimates of court assignment on time-to-default, in the Compton and Norwalk and Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk pairings. However, this appears to be non-robust to the time-to-default measure: that is, the estimates in columns (2) and (3) in Appendix Table J1 are not significant using both time-to-default measures (discussed in Appendix C). The only remaining significant effect is the money judgment amount in the Compton and Norwalk pair, with higher average money judgments for cases assigned to the Compton courthouse. Otherwise, many outcome averages appear similar across courthouses near the boundaries: for instance, time-to-default averages across courthouse pairs are similar, with only a few days difference in time-to-default. Some total case time averages differ (e.g. 270 days in Chatsworth vs 175 days in Van Nuys East), but the differences are not statistically significant. Ongoing differences in average case times may be further investigated, to explore whether observable case, demographic, and neighborhood factors explain total case times in parts of LA County.

5 Testing Mechanisms: Distance-to-Court and Procedures

This section further investigates why default gaps emerge at courthouse boundaries. Because assignment to court is a large bundle of treatments, isolating the precise mechanism determining outcomes requires additional causal assumptions and counterfactual modeling. Here, we test the impact of two particular mechanisms which operate discontinuously at courthouse boundaries as part of a bundle of assigned court treatments: tenant costs (proxied by tenant distance-to-court or measured as general monetary costs) and court procedures (measured by the first principal component of a procedure dimension reduction analysis).[26] Using of mechanism measures, we specify a spatial mechanism model and use variation in outcome and mechanism gaps across boundary segments to estimate common tenant cost and procedure effects. The model allows for spatial heterogeneity across boundary segments in trends and levels, but assumes local continuity at each segment apart from the two studied mechanisms.

Although there is a literature on the impact of tenant costs on defaults and a literature on the importance of eviction court procedures (see Section 1.1 above), this paper quantifies the relative impact of these two mechanisms. Of course, tenant costs and court procedures may impact litigants in different ways at different case phases. Although it may be unlikely that procedural differences influence default outcomes at early stages, known differences in courthouse procedures may nevertheless affect tenant expectations and, thereby, cause defaults. Similarly, distance-to-court may affect certain stages of litigation more acutely and may shape tenant expectations. The model studied here allows for the possibility of procedural gaps or distance-to-court gaps affecting default gaps near courthouse boundaries.

5.1 Procedural Index and Principal Component Analysis (PCA)

The first step in determining the relative impact of procedure vs tenant costs on default outcomes is obtaining a measure of court procedures. To do so, we extract dozens of procedural terms using regular expressions ("regex") from docket records and encode them as binary variables. For example, we encode that a "Demand for Jury Trial" is requested if that term appears in the docket records. The list of binary procedural variables we extracted is recorded in Appendix Table G1.

[26]The procedure and tenant cost mechanisms correspond roughly to the "cost-focused reforms" and "compliance-focused reforms" in Engstrom et al. (Apr. 3, 2025).

There are differences in procedures across courthouses. In Appendix Table G2, we show the averages for our binary procedure variables across the 11 courthouses. The table shows that the appearance of certain procedural terms differs across courthouses. Whether the difference in means across courthouses is significant is tested by likelihood ratio (LR) tests from logistic regression of procedure variables on courthouse indicators, with (gender, race, income) and without controls. The null hypothesis that procedure means are equal across the courthouses is rejected (final column, red-colored p-values) for several procedural variables.

To reduce the dimensionality of the procedural measure, we next turn to a principal component analysis ("PCA"). Because the procedures are correlated[27] and too numerous for causal mechanism analysis, we combine them using PCA into a single procedural index. The idea is to obtain a procedural index that captures the largest share of variation across cases. The resulting first component (Procedure Index) is rescaled from 0 to 100, with higher values representing more procedural activity or procedural intensity.

Three PCA specifications using different sets of procedural variables are used in the mechanism specifications. Histograms of the procedure index by courthouse are included for each procedural variable measure in Appendix Figure G1, Appendix Figure G2, and Appendix Figure G3. The main components of each index vary across specification, but the shape of the procedure index distributions does not vary significantly across courthouse in the three specifications. This suggests that the Procedure Index, i.e. the first principal component which explains the largest share of procedural variation, is similar across courthouses. Nevertheless, the procedure index may differ in cases near the courthouse boundaries and, as a mechanism, cause the local gaps in default outcomes discussed above.

See Appendix G for further discussion of institutional details and analysis of court procedures, including discussion of hearing start times, parking fees, and further detailing the 39 binary procedural variables analyzed from the docket records.

5.2 Mechanism Model

Next, we specify a spatial boundary mechanism model. The model allows for local discontinuities in outcomes and the two mechanisms at each spatial boundary segment, but otherwise assumes local continuity at each boundary segment. Then, using variation across boundary segments in outcome and mechanism discontinuities, the

[27] The correlation may result, e.g., from the intensity or quality of litigation activity.

effect of tenant costs and procedure is identified assuming a common coefficient on each mechanism across boundary segments for each courthouse pair. See Appendix K for a full simulation example further illustrating the model, including specifying an example data-generating process, identification, and estimation details using the segment specific discontinuities.[28]

Denote the local discontinuity in default outcomes Y at the boundary segment s as follows:

$$\Delta Y(s) = \lim_{x \to c^+} \mathbb{E}[Y|X = x, S = s] - \lim_{x \to c^-} \mathbb{E}[Y|X = x, S = s]$$

and similar jumps or discontinuities in the two mechanisms, distance-to-court D and procedure P, at each segment s which we denote:

$$\Delta D(s) = \lim_{x \to c^+} \mathbb{E}[D|X = x, S = s] - \lim_{x \to c^-} \mathbb{E}[D|X = x, S = s]$$
$$\Delta P(s) = \lim_{x \to c^+} \mathbb{E}[P|X = x, S = s] - \lim_{x \to c^-} \mathbb{E}[P|X = x, S = s]$$

We assume, locally around the boundary, a linear structural form of default potential outcomes:

$$Y(X, S, D, P) = \mu(X, S) + \beta_D D + \beta_P P + \epsilon$$

where β_D, β_P are assumed to be the same across boundary segments s and $\mu(X, S)$ is a continuous function of X at each boundary segment. This model allows baseline levels and smooth spatial trends in outcomes to vary flexibly across boundary segments. But it rules out any discontinuous direct effects at the boundary segment s other than via the two mechanisms D and P and assumes common or shared coefficients on D and P across segments.

Using these assumptions, we can obtain for each boundary segment s a differences equation by taking limits from the two sides of the boundary within a segment s:

$$\Delta Y(s) = \beta_D \Delta D(s) + \beta_P \Delta P(s)$$

where we used the identifying restriction that $\lim_{x \to c^+} \mu(x, s) = \lim_{x \to c^-} \mu(x, s)$ for each segment s. See Appendix K for additional details.

[28]The example incorporates spatial heterogeneity (across boundary segments), differences in levels and trends at each boundary segment (provided trends other than the mechanisms are continuous), and discontinuities in mechanisms along the boundary provided there is a shared coefficient on each mechanism term across boundary segments.

Then, with many segments $s = 1, 2, \ldots, \bar{S}$, we can identify β_D, β_P with cross-segment variation in the mechanism discontinuities via a two-stage procedure. First, for each segment s we estimate discontinuities or jumps in outcomes and mechanisms using local comparisons: $\widehat{\Delta Y(s)}, \widehat{\Delta D(s)}, \widehat{\Delta P(s)}$. We estimate the local jumps at each segment two ways in what follows, local linear regression and local differences in means. Second, we estimate the regression:

$$\widehat{\Delta Y(s)} = \beta_D \widehat{\Delta D(s)} + \beta_P \widehat{\Delta P(s)} + u_s$$

across segments. This regression is estimated without an intercept, reflecting the identifying assumption that there is no remaining direct boundary discontinuity once the mechanisms (distance-to-court and procedure) are included. Bootstrapped standard errors are used and specifications varying parameters (e.g. bandwidth) or incorporating certain robustness checks (e.g. covariate controls) are estimated. Please see Appendix K for specification settings, which are also discussed below.

5.3 Mechanism Results

Using the procedure detailed above, we estimate many specifications of the effects of distance-to-court and procedure on default outcomes. Because of the variety of researcher-driven measurement, modeling, and estimation degrees of freedom (Stevenson, 2026; Gelman and Loken, 2013; Leamer, 2010; Sims, 2010), we present distributions of results below across many specifications. Here, the specification settings include the following:

1. Outcome Measures: two outcome measures (the no-imputation case default flag and the imputed unit defaults).
2. Procedure Measures: three procedure index specifications (discussed above).
3. Tenant Cost Measures: two tenant cost measures (distance-to-court proxy and generalized tenant costs, discussed below).
4. First-Stage Estimation: two first-stage jump estimation methods (local linear regression and local difference in means).
5. Bandwidths: various bandwidths around each boundary segment (0.5km, 1km, and 2km).

6. Number Boundary Points: varying number of boundary points (10, 20, 50).
7. Weighted vs Unweighted Estimation: weighted vs unweighted cross-segment boundary regressions.

Appendix K also displays average estimates across specifications broken up by each courthouse pair and various settings.

The main results using distance-to-court as our measure of tenant costs of getting to court are shown below. In Figure 5, we plot histograms of beta coefficient estimates on the two mechanisms (distance-to-court and procedure index) for two outcome measures (the no-imputation case default flag and the imputed unit defaults). In each panel, the average and median estimates, along with interquartile range (IQR) are also labeled. The results here are coefficient estimates in non-standardized terms: for example, a negative estimate of the distance-to-court coefficient (β_D) implies that an increase in the distance-to-court discontinuity decreases the default status discontinuity. Under the identification assumptions, the estimates of the beta coefficients also have a structural interpretation with implications for the marginal effects of the mechanisms on default outcomes. For example, a positive estimate of β_D implies that an increase in distance-to-court increases default status holding procedure fixed.

The results across specifications are shown in Figure 5. The histograms represent specification coefficient values from varying different settings (e.g. bandwidth), measures, or estimation choices. Four panels are shown, with results by the two outcome measures for each of the mechanism coefficients (procedure and distance-to-court). The average, median, and interquartile range across models are displayed in each panel, with the average also plotted as a vertical black dashed line. Recall that the case default flag outcome involves no outcome imputation, whereas the imputed unit defaults outcome involves imputing zeroes to apartment units without observed default evictions.

The results in Figure 5 suggest specification uncertainty. In each panel, the IQRs do not identify the sign of the effect. Moreover, the direction of the effects differ based on outcome measure (procedure beta coefficient) or whether the mean or median is used (distance-to-court beta coefficient, imputed unit defaults outcome). The negative median distance-to-court beta estimates imply that higher distance-to-court decreases defaults, which does not align with the extant eviction literature but may result from the spatial distribution of cases across LA County. In particular, because the largest number of defaults occur in downtown close to courthouses, this may imply a small marginal effect of distance-to-court on defaults. If the effect were small, more data may be needed to overcome the specification uncertainty. And, indeed, standardized estimates included in Appendix Figure K5 suggest that model average and model median effect sizes are relatively small, especially on the distance-to-court (tenant cost) variable. The IQRs imply relatively small effect sizes in three out of four panels, although the wide IQR of procedure index betas using the case default flag outcome contains possibly large effects. Estimates from unweighted regressions are also included in Appendix Figure K8 and Appendix Figure K9.



Figure 5. Distribution of Mechanism Beta Estimates (Distance, Non-Standardized)
Note: Each panel reports non-standardized beta coefficient estimates using two outcome measures (case defaults flags and imputed defaults). Average estimate, median estimate, and IQR are reported in each panel, with the average plotted as the black dashed vertical line. The tenant cost measure used here is the distance-to-court variable.

5.4 Robustness: Generalized Tenant Costs

We also estimate specifications where the distance-to-court measure of tenant costs is replaced with a generalized tenant cost metric. Specifically, we use a generalized cost measure that reflects both the direct costs of getting to court (e.g. distance-to-court, parking fees) and time/opportunity costs of appearing for a court hearing. For tenant i appearing at court c, we define i's generalized cost of attending court c as follows:

$$GC_{ic} = \underbrace{M_{ic}}_{\text{direct costs}} + \underbrace{v_i T_{ic}}_{\text{indirect costs}}$$

where M_{ic} is the direct monetary cost of traveling to court c, T_{ic} is the time it takes to attend court, and v_i is i's hourly time value (opportunity costs). Due to inflation in the 2018–2024 period, we use the FRED database CPI-U series (CPIAUCSL) to inflation-adjust all nominal amounts, with December 2024 as the base period.

First, we measure the direct costs as:

$$M_{ic} = 2 \cdot \text{distance-to-court}_{ic} \cdot \frac{\text{gas price}_{t(i)}}{25} + \text{parking fee}_c$$

This is the monetary cost of i traveling some distance-to-court (roundtrip), assuming a fuel economy of 25mpg and using weekly LA County regular gasoline price data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The variable gas $\text{price}_{t(i)}$ is the weekly price of gas in the week $t(i)$ nearest i's filing date (from docket records). Parking fees vary by courthouse and are further explained in Appendix G.

Next, we impute indirect costs, which are the monetary opportunity costs from having to spend time attending court. We assume the time Tic it takes to attend court is 3.5 hours (either 8:30am–12:00pm or 1:30pm–5:00pm sessions)[29] plus the roundtrip commute time:

$$T_{ic} = 3.5 + 2 \cdot \text{commute-to-court}_{ic}$$

with v_i equal to i's census tract median income converted to an hourly wage (i.e. median income divided by 2080 annual working hours).

The resulting inflation-adjusted generalized cost measure is expressed in December 2024 terms. It varies over time (Appendix Figure K4) and is positively correlated with distance-to-court (Appendix Figure K3).

[29] See Appendix G for further information.

The full mechanism model is re-estimated using the generalized cost measure and the procedure index across specification settings. As above, common mechanism coefficient estimates under the mechanism model are shown in Appendix Figure K6 (non-standardized estimates) and Appendix Figure K7 (standardized estimates) specification histograms. The estimated average, median, and IQR are shown in each panel, with the average coefficients across specifications plotted as a vertical black dashed line. Estimates from unweighted regressions using the generalized cost measure are also included in Appendix Figure K10 and Appendix Figure K11.

The across-specification histograms again imply high uncertainty, with the IQRs failing to identify the sign of the effect. The histograms are approximately normal distributed, with average and median effects directionally similar to the distance-to-court specifications. In standardized terms, the effect sizes are also similar: the median and average effects are small for three out of four panels. The IQRs also imply relatively small effect sizes for three out of four panels, but do not pin down the direction of the coefficients. Overall, the results suggest that the generalized cost measure and distance-to-court measure both produce similar distributions of mechanism coefficient estimates, similar averages and medians across specifications, and similar IQRs containing both positive and negative mechanism coefficient estimates.

6 Conclusion

This paper extends research on the relationship between individual-level characteristics and eviction outcomes by exploring the mundane, yet complex institutional-level processes shaping the likelihood of tenant default in the Los Angeles Superior Court system. The institutional geography of eviction case processing in Los Angeles involves assigning cases into regional courthouses across a large metropolitan county. Since a default judgment occurs at the beginning of the eviction process, some tenants lose the cases against them before they have an opportunity to defend themselves in court. Thus, for tenants facing eviction, the likelihood of losing their case and home, and potentially experiencing homelessness, is a function of institutional factors rather than the individual demographic and cultural variables tested in much of the literature.

We find that the institutionalized and automated process of relying on the drawing of certain boundaries (case assignment) may disadvantage tenants living along the margins of jurisdictional boundaries. Indeed, in our regression discontinuity design, we show there are significant gaps in the local average eviction default probability across the boundaries for different courthouse regions. The results are, however, robust to some specification choices and sensitive to others, which we have described in the main text and detailed more extensively in the Appendices. Although some econometric uncertainty is unavoidable, these details matter because they show where further research and additional data may produce more precise estimates, shedding light on how and why local gaps emerge.

The result is that some tenants living in certain areas are likelier than other tenants to default. The spatial boundary mechanism model offered here further tests how and why local default gaps may emerge. Using data on two mechanisms (tenant costs and court procedures), we specify and estimate a mechanism model with common mechanism coefficients across boundary segments and gaps identified by variation in mechanism gaps along the boundary. The results imply a high degree of econometric uncertainty, with the model largely failing to pin down the direction of the mechanism coefficients (positive or negative). The average and median specification estimates, moreover, often imply small effect sizes for tenant costs, although the data can sustain a wide range of estimates (i.e. wide IQRs).

The multi-faceted nature of eviction institutions makes welfare-improving legal reform difficult, particularly in cities like Los Angeles. The impact of different levers in the eviction machine—assignment maps, court waiting times, legal defense resources, and procedures for dealing with court non-attendance—on tenants, landlords, and the rental market is not fully understood. Determining how to optimally pull these levers should be done *ceteris paribus* and in a data-driven manner. The models here imply that certain mechanisms may be more important than tenant costs of getting to court and courthouse procedural variation. For example, market factors (e.g. housing supply) largely outside judicial control may be larger determinants of aggregate eviction rates.

By focusing on institutional mechanisms affecting eviction default,[30] this paper suggests further study, experimentation, or reform may pay dividends in eviction prevention. Seemingly small interventions to redraw and optimize jurisdictional maps could decrease defaults and, by extension, procedural inequality in the civil justice system. The court assignment lever can also complement other policies, like creating tenant protections to keep tenants housed and expanding tenants' access to attorneys. This multi-pronged policy approach toward eviction cases could help mitigate the

[30]See also Estes (2025).

consequences of LA County's affordable housing and homelessness problems.

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APPENDICES

A Appendix A: Creating the Courthouse Assignment Map

Appendix A details the creation of the courthouse assignment map and shapefiles. As discussed in the main body of the paper, the LA County filing rule for evictions is unique to eviction cases. Assignment to a court is determined by a neighborhood–zip code pair. To create the assignment shpaefile, we started with zip-codes where the filing rule uniquely specifies a courthouse. Using zip code shapefiles from LA County geohub, this determines the courthouse assignment map for most of LA County. In the remaining zip codes where there are multiple eviction courthouses, we had to determine the neighborhood boundaries within the zip code. We used other LA County Geohub shapefiles (i.e. the census tract shapefiles) to determine neighborhoods within the remaining unassigned zip codes by matching LASC assignment table neighborhood names to census tract neighborhood names in the LA County Geohub shapefiles.

Next, if a particular neighborhood/city is always assigned to a particular courthouse (across all zip-codes), then we assigned the census tracts with those neighborhood/city names to that courthouse. We then manually created the courthouse assignment shapefiles for zip codes where assignment is done by a street divider. This involved using street and highway shapefiles from LA County and the Census shapefiles. Finally, for any remaining unassigned census tracts, we used the scraped eviction data from 2018 to determine where the vast majority of cases for that census tract are assigned. We assumed that the majority assigned courthouse was the correct one, i.e. we minimized classifying observed evictions as "misfiled."

Due to the complex governing structure of LA County, some of the city/neighborhoods listed in the official Zip Code Table are not official, incorporated governing regions. Therefore, the precise boundaries of some neighborhoods (and, consequently, some city-zip pairs) is difficult to ascertain. Fortunately, 89% (480 of 539) of the zip codes in the Zip Code Table are uniquely assigned to one courthouse. For example, in Appendix Table A1 the highlighted rows for 90006 show that both Koreatown and Los Angeles evictions are assigned to Stanley Mosk Courthouse.

Appendix Table A1. Simplifying Assignment: Unique Courthouses

Zip Code	City/Neighborhood	Modifier	Courthouse
90006	KOREATOWN		Stanley Mosk Courthouse
90006	LOS ANGELES		Stanley Mosk Courthouse
90007	LOS ANGELES		Stanley Mosk Courthouse
90008	BALDWIN HILLS		Stanley Mosk Courthouse
90008	CRENSHAW		Stanley Mosk Courthouse
90008	LIEMERT PARK		Stanley Mosk Courthouse
90008	LOS ANGELES		Santa Monica Courthouse

Accordingly, we work with a Simplified Zip Code Table that aggregates neighborhoods in the event that all neighborhoods within a zip code are assigned to one unique courthouse. For instance, Appendix Table A2 below highlights the Simplified Zip Code Table for the 90006 zip code.

Appendix Table A2. Simplified Zip Code Table

Zip Code	City/Neighborhood	Modifier	Courthouse
90006	KOREATOWN-LOS ANGELES		Stanley Mosk Courthouse
90007	LOS ANGELES		Stanley Mosk Courthouse
90008	BALDWIN HILLS		Stanley Mosk Courthouse
90008	CRENSHAW		Stanley Mosk Courthouse
90008	LIEMERT PARK		Stanley Mosk Courthouse
90008	LOS ANGELES		Santa Monica Courthouse

Using the Simplified Zip Code Table and the official LA County Zip Codes shapefiles, we are able to unambiguously determine where the vast majority of eviction cases in Los Angeles County must be filed. For the remaining zip codes where eviction cases are assigned by neighborhood or location relative to a street to different courthouses, we determine the contours of particular neighborhood-zip code pairs using official shapefiles from the LA County eGIS Program.

We then checked the map against eviction records. If a neighborhood-zip code pair had a majority of filed cases with observed courthouses that did not match the courthouse we specified originally for the region, then we corrected that region's filing courthouse. Even after incorporating this correction into the courthouse filing map, approximately 2% of cases have observed filing courthouses that do not match the "true" or "correct" filing courthouse for that region. See Appendix H for misfiling discussion and analysis.

B Appendix B: Docket Records (Scraping the LASC Portal, Sampling Rates, Geocoding Addresses)

Appendix B describes how the docket record data was obtained. We obtained docket records from scraping the LA Superior Court public case portal. Court filing number is determined by four pieces of information in a pre-specified format: year, court location, case type, and case number. Therefore, we are able to scrape every number up to the total number of records, which we know from FOIA requests. In general, we added a search buffer in case the FOIA volume data was slightly off. Because the records themselves have dates, we check that the final docket we find is close to "12-31-YEAR". In unlawful detainer cases, this means that case numbers look like:

$$\overbrace{17}^{\text{year}}\ \underbrace{\text{PD}}_{\text{court}}\ \overbrace{\text{UD}}^{\text{type}}\quad \underbrace{00001}_{\text{filing number}}$$

which is a 2017 Pasadena courthouse unlawful detainer (UD) case with filing number 00001.

Over time, the filing formats changed, which are recorded by local court rules. Changes to sealing records rules changed too, effective Jan. 1, 2017. The local rules of court contain information on the filing numbers and sealing laws, which were used to obtain docket records.

B.1 Default Evictions Sampling Rates

This section describes sampling rates from the FOIA total filing numbers and the number of defaults we observe. Note that FOIA data collection includes only years 2016–2023 in full, whereas scraped data includes additional cases from later years (2024–2025). Here are sampling rates for years with available FOIA data:



Appendix Figure B1. Sampling Rates using FOIA Data: 2016-2023
Note: The sampling rates are the number of docket records collected divided by the case number reports from FOIA data. The FOIA data are only complete from 2009-2023, with totals also available for Jan 2024–Mar 2024. Note also that the court assignment rule changed in Late 2017, but is unchanged from 2018–2025.

Most of the observed cases are residential default judgments, so the sampling rate is close to the default judgment rate at each courthouse for each year. Note also that the denominators are the higher of either the FOIA number reported to us by LASC or the last scraped case number, in cases of disagreement. Because 2022 case records are largely unavailable (near zero in Appendix Figure B1), we exclude 2022 from the analyses. Records from the 2020–2021 years were also unavailable to scrape due to different pandemic era rules (e.g. moratoria). However, note that FOIA data from LASC on filing numbers is shown in the top-right panel of Appendix Figure F1. Filings were much lower in 2020 (13,796 filings) and 2021 (12,646 filings), with an uptick in 2022 (34,398 filings).

The main eviction rules and regulations affecting the 2020–2022 years are briefly described here. The discussion here is not comprehensive but is meant to illustrate why the 2020–2022 years do not have many (if any) observable docket records for limited residential unlawful detainer actions in LA County.

Local. At the local level, the LA County COVID-19 Tenant Protections Resolution modified eviction rules, which was in effect from March 4, 2020 until March 31, 2023.[31] The Resolution protected tenants from eviction who were unable to pay rent due to the pandemic. Expiration of this LA County Resolution meant that "[n]ormal rent payments must resume for rent due on or after April 1, 2023 to avoid being evicted."[32]

State. At the state level, California passed several acts modifying eviction rules and providing tenants protection who were unable to pay rent due to COVID-19 circumstances, including: California Assembly Bill 3088 (COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act of 2020); California Senate Bill 91, which extended Assembly Bill 3088 protections; and California Assembly Bill 832 (COVID-19 Rental Housing Recovery Act). These acts provided tenant protections from September 2020 to September 2021, with some rental assistance and modified eviction rules lasting until March 2022. The thrust of the acts were to protect those "who have experienced COVID-19-related financial distress from being evicted for failing to make rental payments."[33]

Federal. At the federal level, the CDC's eviction moratorium was in effect from September 2020 until August 2021, when it was struck down by the Supreme Court in *Ala. Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS*, 594 U.S. 758 (2021).

B.2 Geocoding the Addresses

The number of records observed at each step of the geocoding process are displayed in Appendix Figure B2. The percentages at the top of each year grouping give the proportion of eviction records matched in the final step to assessor data from the

[31] https://dcba.lacounty.gov/noevictions/

[32] https://dcba.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/LA-COUNTY-TENANT-PROTECTIONS-RESOLUTION-FAQ 24.2024-1.pdf

[33] Per AB 3088, landlords were required to notify "tenants who, as of September 1, 2020" did not pay rent of the following "Notice from the State of California":

> "The California Legislature has enacted the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act of 2020 which protects renters who have experienced COVID-19-related financial distress from being evicted for failing to make rental payments due between March 1, 2020, and January 31, 2021. 'COVID-19-related financial distress' means..."

set of eviction records that contain a nonempty address. In the process of cleaning, subsetting to residential defaults, geocoding, and matching to assessor information we keep more than 70% of the total records.



Appendix Figure B2. Defaults Geocoding & Matching Rates

Note: The Total Records are the number of total case docket records collected from LASC. The Nonempty Addresses are the number of records with an ascertainable address from the docket records. The Initial Clean is the number of case records flagged as a "residential" eviction with a "default" outcome. Geocoded numbers are the number of cases with a "High" or "Exact" geocoding match from the Mapbox API. Finally, the Assessor Matched numbers are those records with a match from the LA County Assessor records with non-empty "Number of Units" in the apartment building. The percentages at the top of each year are the number of eviction records matched in the final step over the number of eviction records that contain a nonempty address.

C Appendix C: Time-to-Default Plots

Appendix C contains additional plots documenting how long it takes for the default cases to reach default status. We calculate the number of days to default status using regular expressions on the raw docket data.

First, we extract three dates from the raw case data: the case start-date (measured as the date on the docket the case is assigned to a judge), the earliest possible default entry date (measured as the first appearance of "C.C.P. 415.46" or "C.C.P. 1169" on the docket), and the latest possible default entry date (measured as the last appearance of "C.C.P. 415.46" or "C.C.P. 1169" on the docket).[34] In some (but not many) cases, the last appearance of a default entry differs from the first default entry date. This makes only a small difference in the mean across all years and courthouses (see plots below).

Next, we compute different timing measures. The first set of measures is the time-to-default: the number of days from the assignment of the case to a judge and the first entry of the default judgment on the docket. For each default case j, this is computed as follows:

$$\text{time-to-default}_j = \text{default entered on docket}_j - \text{judge assigned}_j$$

In some cases, the docket record does not contain the date default judgment is entered. We use early-estimated (E) and late-estimated (L) time-to-default measures, which use the different default entry dates (earliest possible and latest possible).

The second measure calculates the total case time in case j. Using regular expressions, we extract all dates of the format "MM/DD/YYYY". We then compute the difference between the earliest and latest date in case j:

$$\text{total time}_j = \text{latest date on docket}_j - \text{earliest date on docket}_j$$

This measure is computed for every case in our dataset.

Using these measures, we observe that the time-to-default and total case times are highest in 2023. For example, Appendix Figure C1 shows the 2023 time-to-default density is shifted further rightward than pre-pandemic years.

[34] To cast a wide net, the regex search is for the dates where either "415.46" or "1169" appear.



Appendix Figure C1. Time-to-Default: Early-Estimated Default Entered Date
Note: Using only residential default evictions from after Sep. 1, 2017, the mean early-estimated time-to-default is plotted as the dashed black vertical line in each year panel. Densities are plotted for the subset of cases with time-to-default less than or equal to 90 days.



Appendix Figure C2. Time-to-Default: Late-Estimated Default Entered Date
Note: Using only residential default evictions from after Sep. 1, 2017, the mean late-estimated time-to-default is plotted as the dashed black vertical line in each year panel. Densities are plotted for the subset of cases with time-to-default less than or equal to 90 days.

We also record the box plots of the early-estimated time-to-default below for each courthouse pooled across all years: although there is variation across courthouses, the median time-to-default is similar for the 2017-2023 years.



Appendix Figure C3. Time-to-Default: By Courthouses

Note: Analysis is restricted to residential default evictions from after Sep. 1, 2017 here. The data here is also restricted to cases that default in fewer than 60 days and the eleven main eviction courthouses.

Alternatively, we can estimate the start date by the earliest date that appears within the docket. Then we can compute the difference in days between this start date and the estimated default date (early or late). The plots below in Appendix Figure C4 give densities for estimated time-to-default under this different way to measure the start date: the new mean estimated time-to-default is approximately 28 days (early-estimated default date) or 29 days (late-estimated default date).



Appendix Figure C4. Time-to-Default: Using Earliest Case Dates
Note: The left panel plots yearly densities for the number of days to default, using the earliest case date and early-estimated default date. The mean time-to-default (27.9 days) is plotted as the dashed black vertical line. The right panel plots yearly densities for the number of days to default, using the earliest case date and late-estimated default date. The mean time-to-default (29.1 days) is plotted as the dashed black vertical line. Analysis is restricted to residential default evictions from after Sep. 1, 2017 here.

D Appendix D: Total Case Time Plots

Appendix D contains plots on total case times. We extract all dates in the format Month/Day/Year (e.g. "01/01/2018") from the raw docket data and take the earliest and latest dates that appear in the record. The total time is the difference between the latest and earliest dates in the docket data for a given eviction case. The two plots below contain the density plots for the subset of cases that are finished within 1 year or 3 years, respectively.



Appendix Figure D1. Total Case Time (< 1 year cases only)

Note: The yearly mean case time and the median case time are plotted as the solid black vertical and dashed lines, respectively. Densities are plotted for the subset of cases with case times less than or equal to one year. Analysis is restricted to residential default evictions from after Sep. 1, 2017 here.



Appendix Figure D2. Total Case Time (< 3 years cases only)

Note: The yearly mean case time and the median case time are plotted as the solid black vertical and dashed lines, respectively. Densities are plotted for the subset of cases with case times less than or equal to one year. Analysis is restricted to residential default evictions from after Sep. 1, 2017 here.

E Appendix E: Money Judgment Plots

Appendix E contains plots concerning money judgments in the observed eviction cases. We first plot the densities for money judgments across years (pooled courthouses) and density plots for courthouses (years pooled).



Appendix Figure E1. Yearly Money Judgments

Note: The yearly mean total money judgment is plotted as the dashed black vertical line. Densities are plotted for the subset of cases with money judgments less than $20,000. Analysis is restricted to residential default evictions from after Sep. 1, 2017 here.

We also plot the densities for each courthouse across all years in the sample for different subsets: cases with total money judgments less than $5,000, $10,000, and $20,000.



Appendix Figure E2. Money Judgments by Courthouse ($< \$5,000$ cases only)
Note: The black vertical lines show the means for each courthouse. Only the main eleven courthouses are shown and cases with no money judgment information are excluded. Analysis is restricted to residential default evictions from after Sep. 1, 2017 here.



Appendix Figure E3. Money Judgments by Courthouse ($< \$10,000$ cases only)
Note: The black vertical lines show the means for each courthouse. Only the main eleven courthouses are shown and cases with no money judgment information are excluded. Analysis is restricted to residential default evictions from after Sep. 1, 2017 here.



Appendix Figure E4. Money Judgments by Courthouse ($<$ \$20,000 cases only)
Note: The black vertical lines show the means for each courthouse. Only the main eleven courthouses are shown and cases with no money judgment information are excluded. Analysis is restricted to residential default evictions from after Sep. 1, 2017 here.

F Appendix F: Data Overview

Appendix F gives an overview of the eviction data (from the Eviction Lab and data we collected) and CA statewide trends.



Appendix Figure F1. Eviction Filing Volume (CA & LA County) and Disposition Times (CA)
Note: The top left panel shows the modeled filing estimates from the Eviction Lab (Gromis et al., 2022). The top right panel shows the aggregate filing data we collected for LA County (2018-2023 emphasized). The bottom panel shows the statewide percentage of eviction cases disposed in 45 days (blue) and 30 days (red) from the 2024 Court Statistics Report.

G Appendix G: Procedures in Docket Records

Appendix G describes the docket procedural variables and further court information.

Appendix Table G1. Procedural Events in Docket Records (Collected by Regex)

Category	**Procedural Event**
Initial Filing & Case Setup	Complaint Civil Case Cover Sheet Supplemental Unlawful Detainer Cover Sheet Summons on Complaint Notice of Case Assignment (Limited Civil) Property Owner / Landlord Only Hearing Notice Online Dispute Resolution Notice
Service of Process	Proof of Personal Service Proof of Substituted Service Proof of Service by Mail Notice of Unlawful Detainer Mailed Show Cause for Failure to File Proof of Service
Pleadings & Motions	Answer Demand for Jury Trial Request or Counter-Request to Set Case for Trial Order on Court Fee Waiver
Trial Preparation	Notice of Unlawful Detainer Trial Trial Brief Jury Instructions Witness List Exhibit List Statement of the Case Meet-and-Confer on Joint Trial Documents
Hearings & Other Orders	Jury Trial Scheduled Minute Order Certificate of Mailing (Jury Trial) Notice of Ruling Ex Parte App. to Stay Execution of Judgment Ex Parte Hearing Motion to Set Aside / Vacate Judgment Hearing on Motion to Set Aside / Vacate Judgment
Judgments & Defaults	Judgment – Unlawful Detainer Notice of Entry of Judgment Court Orders Judgment Entered Request for Entry of Default / Judgment Default Entered
Enforcement & Writs	Application for Issuance of Writ of Execution Writ of Possession Writ Return

G.1 Procedures by Courthouse

Average Procedures by Courthouse

	Antelope	Chatsworth	Compton	Inglewood	Long Bch	Norwalk	Pasadena	Santa Mon.	Mosk	Van Nuys E.	W. Covina	p-value	p-value (controls)
complaint	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000		
civil_case_cover_sheet	1.000	1.000	0.999	1.000	0.999	1.000	0.999	0.999	1.000	0.999	0.999	0.039	0.060
supplemental_ud_cover_sheet	0.350	0.385	0.314	0.341	0.352	0.302	0.441	0.255	0.469	0.328	0.327	<0.001	<0.001
summons_on_complaint	0.998	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.999	0.999	1.000	1.000	0.999	1.000	1.000	0.060	0.101
notice_case_assignment_limited	1.000	1.000	0.911	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	<0.001	<0.001
landlord_only_hearing_notice	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000		
odr_ud_notice	0.413	0.390	0.340	0.357	0.359	0.333	0.463	0.259	0.480	0.328	0.344	<0.001	<0.001
pos_personal	0.561	0.497	0.671	0.619	0.611	0.689	0.517	0.503	0.567	0.552	0.643	<0.001	<0.001
pos_substituted	0.705	0.695	0.716	0.777	0.721	0.769	0.673	0.621	0.724	0.696	0.700	<0.001	<0.001
pos_mail	0.022	0.017	0.053	0.024	0.028	0.017	0.026	0.054	0.033	0.044	0.012	<0.001	<0.001
notice_ud_mailed	0.999	1.000	1.000	0.999	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.513	0.533
osc_fail_pos	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.999	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.550	0.623
answer	0.019	0.030	0.035	0.019	0.022	0.009	0.019	0.023	0.037	0.037	0.007	<0.001	<0.001
demand_jury	0.002	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.009	0.004	0.000	<0.001	<0.001
request_set_for_trial	0.006	0.009	0.010	0.046	0.005	0.027	0.005	0.117	0.074	0.093	0.003	<0.001	<0.001
fee_waiver_order	0.122	0.113	0.255	0.147	0.101	0.141	0.121	0.088	0.142	0.103	0.098	<0.001	<0.001
notice_ud_trial	0.004	0.009	0.008	0.009	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.010	0.005	0.006	0.003	0.102	0.099
trial_brief	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.441	0.951
jury_instructions	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.486	0.523
witness_list	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.199	0.280
exhibit_list	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.272	0.276
statement_of_case	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.234	0.200
decl_meet_confer_joint_docs	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		
jury_trial_scheduled	0.006	0.013	0.013	0.015	0.007	0.013	0.006	0.011	0.007	0.007	0.004	<0.001	<0.001
minute_order	0.116	0.103	0.155	0.121	0.083	0.092	0.116	0.127	0.109	0.086	0.081	<0.001	<0.001
cert_of_mailing_jury	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.113	0.113
notice_of_ruling	0.010	0.027	0.020	0.030	0.018	0.025	0.016	0.039	0.038	0.033	0.017	<0.001	<0.001
ex_parte_stay_exec_app	0.043	0.026	0.081	0.052	0.029	0.023	0.039	0.024	0.027	0.022	0.021	<0.001	<0.001
ex_parte_hearing	0.035	0.029	0.043	0.010	0.021	0.034	0.042	0.023	0.031	0.031	0.024	<0.001	<0.001
motion_set_aside_vacate	0.026	0.015	0.011	0.017	0.011	0.009	0.010	0.014	0.031	0.021	0.017	<0.001	<0.001
hearing_motion_set_aside	0.026	0.016	0.012	0.016	0.011	0.010	0.011	0.014	0.031	0.023	0.016	<0.001	<0.001
judgment_ud	0.952	0.975	0.958	0.969	0.971	0.970	0.980	0.974	0.978	0.976	0.968	<0.001	<0.001
notice_entry_judgment	0.060	0.019	0.046	0.016	0.010	0.060	0.259	0.018	0.051	0.097	0.010	<0.001	<0.001
court_orders_judgment_entered	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.755	0.792
request_entry_default	1.000	0.999	0.999	0.998	1.000	0.998	1.000	0.998	1.000	1.000	0.999	0.145	0.206
default_entered	0.999	0.999	0.997	0.987	0.998	0.998	0.996	0.997	1.000	0.999	0.997	<0.001	<0.001
app_writ_exec_pos_sale	0.169	0.218	0.265	0.180	0.196	0.187	0.266	0.164	0.206	0.156	0.192	<0.001	<0.001
writ_possession	0.858	0.938	0.861	0.833	0.913	0.915	0.821	0.807	0.900	0.823	0.912	<0.001	<0.001
writ_return	0.806	0.707	0.532	0.555	0.778	0.679	0.701	0.404	0.630	0.664	0.831	<0.001	<0.001

Appendix Table G2. Procedure Averages by Courthouse

Note: Columns give procedure averages by courthouse. For rows with variation, the last column is a likelihood ratio test p-value from logistic regressions of procedures on courthouses, whose null is procedure means in each row are equal (significant p-values at 0.05 level shown in red).

G.2 Hearing Start Times

Per the LASC Fourth Amended Standing Order, hearing times in the 11 courthouses are non-uniform. Unfortunately, however, the available docket records do not contain information on the precise times when cases are heard, or the case order on a given day. Nevertheless, per the Order the hearing start times for eviction proceedings are as follows: Antelope Valley on Monday and Wednesday at 8:30am; Chatsworth on Mondays and Wednesdays at 8:30am; Compton on Mondays and Wednesdays at 8:30am; Inglewood on Mondays to Fridays at 1:30pm; Long Beach on Mondays and Wednesdays at 1:30pm; Norwalk on Mondays to Fridays at 9:30am; Pasadena on Mondays to Fridays at 1:30pm; Santa Monica on Mondays and Wednesdays at 8:30am, 10:00am, or 3:00pm; Van Nuys East on Fridays at 8:30am and 10:00am; West Covina on Mondays to Fridays at 8:30am; and Stanley Mosk on Mondays at 1:30pm, Tuesdays at 1:30pm, Wednesdays at 8:30am, or Thursdays at 8:30am. Hearing times for ex parte applications differ and are generally heard Mondays through Fridays. Because of the uncertainty in hearing times, it is important to note that commute-to-court time estimates may suffer from measurement error, which is one reason to prefer using distance-to-court metrics as a proxy for the tenant cost of getting to court. However, all these metrics are highly correlated and, in companion work, differences from using commute-to-court times versus distance-to-court are minimal. See Estes (2025) for further details.

G.3 Parking Fees

Here, we describe the parking fees we assume by courthouse for the generalized cost measure, which we use as an alternative to distance-to-court as a measure of estimating tenant costs of getting to court. The costs for the eleven courthouses used in computing our metric are as follows: Antelope Valley Courthouse is free (lot near courthouse);[35] Chatsworth Courthouse is $7 (9375 Penfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 91311);[36] Compton Courthouse is $7 (422 South Acacia Avenue, Compton, CA 90220);[37] Inglewood Courthouse is $8 (1 East Regent Street, Inglewood, CA 90301);[38] Long Beach Courthouse is $16.49 (101 S. Magnolia Ave Long Beach, CA

[35] https://www.lacourt.ca.gov/courthouse/info/atp

[36] https://abmparking.com/facilities/chatsworth-court-lot/

[37] https://www.lacourt.ca.gov/courthouse/info/com and https://parkchirp.com/facilities/compton-courthouse-garage/

[38] https://www.lacourt.ca.gov/courthouse/info/ing and https://abmparking.com/facilities/inglewood-courthouse-parking/

90802);[39] Norwalk Courthouse is $16 (Norwalk Civic Center Avenida Manuel Salinas Los Angeles Norwalk, CA 90650);[40] Pasadena Courthouse is $10 (240 Ramona Street, Pasadena, CA 91107);[41] Santa Monica Courthouse is $7 (333 Civic Center Dr Santa Monica, 90401);[42] Van Nuys East Courthouse is $10 (6170 Sylmar Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 91401);[43] West Covina Courthouse is free (lot near courthouse);[44] and Stanley Mosk Courthouse is $20 at several lots near the courthouse.[45]

G.4 Procedural PCA Histograms

Procedure index histograms are shown below using different sets of procedures. The captions in each plot detail the procedures used to construct the index and the largest component procedures of each index.

[39] https://www.lacourt.ca.gov/courthouse/info/lb and https://en.parkopedia.com/parking/garage/superior_court_of_california/90802/long_beach/?arriving=202604041500&leaving=202604041700

[40] https://www.lacourt.ca.gov/courthouse/info/se and https://en.parkopedia.com/parking/garage/norwalk_civic_center/90650/norwalk/

[41] https://www.lacourt.ca.gov/courthouse/info/pas and https://abmparking.com/facilities/pasadena-court-garage/. Since hearing start times at Pasadena are 1:30pm, we assume the pre-2pm $10 rate applies instead of the post-2pm $5 rate.

[42] https://www.lacourt.ca.gov/courthouse/info/sm and https://www.santamonica.gov/places/parking-lots/civic-center-parking-structure. Since we assume 3.5 hours spent at the courthouse, this corresponds to a $7 rate. Note that the daily maximum rate is $14.

[43] https://www.lacourt.ca.gov/courthouse/info/nw and https://abmparking.com/facilities/van-nuys-court/. Since hearing start times at Van Nuys East are in the mornings, we assume the morning rate (6am–2pm) of $10 applies.

[44] https://www.lacourt.ca.gov/courthouse/info/cit

[45] https://www.lacourt.ca.gov/courthouse/info/la. Per Parkopedia, there are several lots near the Stanley Mosk Courthouse with $20 rates, including: Grand Park (PCAM Lot #10), 145 N Broadway, Downtown, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Music Center Garage 111 S Grand Avenue, Downtown, Los Angeles, CA 90012; and The Music Center, 135 N Grand Ave, Downtown, Los Angeles, CA 90012. The first lot is near the LA County Law Library, which is across the street from the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.



Appendix Figure G1. PCA Procedure Index Histograms by Court (procedure all)
Note: Procedure index (standardized first principal component values) shown in histograms for each courthouse. This PCA procedure index is constructed using the following binary procedure variables: complaint; civil_case_cover_sheet; supplemental_ud_cover_sheet; summons_on_complaint; notice_case_assignment_limited; landlord_only_hearing_notice; odr_ud_notice; pos_personal; pos_substituted; pos_mail; notice_ud_mailed; osc_fail_pos; answer; demand_jury; request_set_for_trial; fee_waiver_order; notice_ud_trial; trial_brief; jury_instructions; witness_list; exhibit_list; statement_of_case; decl_meet_confer_joint_docs; jury_trial_scheduled; minute_order; cert_of_mailing_jury; notice_of_ruling; ex_parte_stay_exec_app; ex_parte_hearing; motion_set_aside_vacate; hearing_motion_set_aside. The five variables with highest weight in this procedure index specification are: minute_order (0.0875), fee_waiver_order (0.0804), motion_set_aside_vacate (0.0802), hearing_motion_set_aside (0.0802), and ex_parte_hearing (0.0781). Variance in these procedures explained by first principal component is 0.1478.



Appendix Figure G2. PCA Procedure Index Histograms by Court (procedure extended)

Note: Procedure index (standardized first principal component values) shown in histograms for each courthouse. This PCA procedure index is constructed using the following binary procedure variables: complaint; civil_case_cover_sheet; supplemental_ud_cover_sheet; summons_on_complaint; notice_case_assignment_limited; landlord_only_hearing_notice; odr_ud_notice; pos_personal; pos_substituted; pos_mail; notice_ud_mailed; osc_fail_pos; answer; demand_jury; request_set_for_trial; fee_waiver_order; notice_ud_trial; trial_brief; jury_instructions; witness_list; exhibit_list; statement_of_case; decl_meet_confer_joint_docs. The five variables with highest weight in this procedure index specification are: witness_list (0.1678), jury_instructions (0.1567), exhibit_list (0.1447), statement_of_case (0.1341), and demand_jury (0.0708). Variance in these procedures explained by first principal component is 0.1486.



Appendix Figure G3. PCA Procedure Index Histograms by Court (procedure core)

Note: Procedure index (standardized first principal component values) shown in histograms for each courthouse. This PCA procedure index is constructed using the following binary procedure variables: complaint; civil_case_cover_sheet; supplemental_ud_cover_sheet; summons_on_complaint; notice_case_assignment_limited; landlord_only_hearing_notice; odr_ud_notice; pos_personal; pos_substituted; pos_mail; notice_ud_mailed; osc_fail_pos. The five variables with highest weight in this procedure index specification are: supplemental_ud_cover_sheet (0.3760), odr_ud_notice (0.3753), pos_personal (0.1058), pos_ substituted (0.0471), and notice_case_assignment_limited (0.0392). Variance in these procedures explained by first principal component is 0.2010.

H Appendix H: Misfiled Cases

Appendix H discusses possible explanations for the observed phenomenon of misfiled cases. Misfiling is when a docket record's observed courthouse does not match the proper filing courthouse from the LA County Zip Code assignment rule (Table 1). Because the misfiling classification is map-dependent, we proceed conservatively. Specifically, we assume that, in each neighborhood-zip pair, the majority of cases are filed in the correct courthouse. Even under this assumption, approximately 2.3% of the eviction cases are misfiled (2018, 2019, 2023). By comparison, the baseline map created (see Appendix A) had 5.5% of cases classified as misfiled (2018, 2019, 2023). As discussed in-text, we restrict analyses to correctly filed cases only in the main analyses.

Here we explore three possibilities for misfiling. First, the courthouse assignment map could be wrong.[46] Second, cases might be incorrectly geo-located: the Mapbox API could be returning incorrect lat-long coordinates for certain addresses. Third, landlords may knowingly or unknowingly file cases in the incorrect courthouse.[47]

The first possibility is unlikely in regions with observed eviction cases. Although we cannot fully rule out that the map is incorrect in areas with no observed eviction cases, in regions with observed eviction records it is often not possible to draw a map that clearly separates the observed eviction cases into consistent, continguous filing regions. For example, in the left panel of Appendix Figure H1 there are eviction cases observed in Hyde Park (Zip 90043) from three different courthouses. There is no contiguous map separating Inglewood and Santa Monica misfiled cases from the correctly filed Stanley Mosk cases because misfiled cases are stacked "on top of" correctly filed cases.

[46]This could occur because neighborhoods and zip codes lack clear, defined geographical boundaries. Indeed, despite using the most current LA County geospatial data, there are some regions in the court filing table that do not correspond to the names given to particular areas of LA County by the assignment rule.

[47]A fourth possibility is that clerks or judges refiled the cases to change the venue. We found no instances of refiling among the cases we label misfiled.



Appendix Figure H1. Misfiling: Zip 90043 Example & Geolocating Check
Note: In the left panel, the background color is the most observed filing courthouse in the region. Each dot is a building with observed default eviction cases, which is colored and shaped by the observed courthouse in the eviction records. In the right panel, we manually checked 10% of the cases we label as misfiled with Google Maps. The histogram of the distance from the Google Maps to the Mapbox API coordinates are shown above.

The second possibility is an error in geo-locating these cases. We manually checked a random subset of the misfiled cases for geo-location errors. We compared the lat-long Mapbox locations with the Google Maps lat-long locations. We assume for this exercise that the Google Maps coordinates are "ground truth," although in some cases there may be errors in Google Maps as well. In the right panel of Appendix Figure H1, we find that the vast majority (89%) of the geocoded coordinates from Mapbox are very close ($<$ 100 meters) to the Google Maps coordinates. Only eight cases (4.8%) of the manual checks were very clearly wrong, by which we mean that the Google Maps coordinates were more than 1 mile from the location of the Mapbox API coordinates.

Finally, we discuss a third possible explanation for misfiling: landlords file in the incorrect courthouse. Misfiling is not necessarily nefarious, as it could be due to confusion or lack of information. Indeed, in some regions with misfiled cases the assignment rule (Table 1) is relatively complicated.[48] Alternatively, landlords may strategically disadvantage tenants by misfiling in distant courthouses. Using the docket records, we test whether landlords strategically disadvantage tenants by filing in more distant courthouses. To test whether landlords are strategic, we compare

[48]Meaning the assignment rule does not pick out one unique courthouse for the zip code.

two distance histograms. In Appendix Figure H2, the red histogram is the distance from the tenant address to the assigned courthouse, whereas the blue histogram is the distance from the tenant address to the observed filing courthouse.



Appendix Figure H2. Misfiled Cases: Distance to Observed vs Assigned Court
Note: The blue histogram is the distance to observed court (among misfiled cases) and the red histogram is the distance to the assigned court (among misfiled cases). The KS statistic can be used to test the null hypothesis that the distances are drawn from the same distribution.

Although the average distance to the observed courthouse is 0.11 miles further for tenants, we cannot statistically distinguish between the two distributions ($p \approx 0.0874$) using the standard KS test. In other words, there is no statistical evidence of landlord strategic filing to disadvantage tenants among the cases we here label misfiled.

It has long been recognized that clear legal rules lower legal costs and reduce uncertainty.[49] An unclear procedural rule like the LA County eviction assignment mechanism can be clarified or refashioned. Although the optimal assignment rule is beyond the scope of this paper, we have identified some neighborhood-zip pairs (e.g. Hyde Park in Appendix Figure H1) where there is, at least in practice, assignment uncertainty.

[49] See, e.g., Kaplow (1992).

I Appendix I: Covariate Continuity Tests with `rdrobust`

Appendix I includes covariate continuity checks for several pre-determined covariates across each courthouse pair spatial boundary. Using the pre-determined covariates as the outcome variables, we look for null treatment effects across the boundaries for the following variables: property assessment variables from LA County Assessor datasets (building total value and taxable value); demographic variables (ACS-imputed female, white variables and predicted race/gender variables from docket record names using `wru` package); income variables (ACS-imputed median income and rent); and representation variables (tenant and plaintiff landlord representation rates, from docket records). The `rdrobust` treatment effect estimates on each pre-determined covariate, 95% confidence interval (CI), and robust p-values are recorded for each courthouse pair below.

Appendix Table I1. Chatsworth and Van Nuys East: Covariate Continuity Checks

Covariate	Robust Estimate	Robust CI	Robust p-value
Total Value (millions)	15.85	(9.80, 21.89)	<0.001
Taxable Value (millions)	16.53	(10.45, 22.60)	<0.001
Female	-167.11	(-264.66, -69.56)	<0.001
White	2.13	(-112.53, 116.79)	0.971
Median Income	18686.45	(12731.64, 24641.27)	<0.001
Predicted White	0.01	(-0.06, 0.08)	0.759
Predicted Female	0.13	(-0.04, 0.30)	0.137
Predicted Black	0.02	(-0.02, 0.07)	0.361
Predicted Hispanic	-0.04	(-0.16, 0.08)	0.490
Rent	-45.82	(-179.91, 88.28)	0.503
Tenant Representation	0.02	(-0.03, 0.08)	0.374
Plaintiff Representation	0.05	(-0.01, 0.11)	0.123

Appendix Table I2. Compton and Norwalk: Covariate Continuity Checks

Covariate	Robust Estimate	Robust CI	Robust p-value
Total Value (millions)	-8.85	(-11.91, -5.78)	<0.001
Taxable Value (millions)	3.24	(0.44, 6.04)	0.023
Female	165.37	(73.07, 257.66)	<0.001
White	6.01	(-90.36, 102.38)	0.903
Median Income	4252.52	(21.65, 8483.40)	0.049
Predicted White	0.13	(0.06, 0.20)	<0.001
Predicted Female	-0.02	(-0.22, 0.18)	0.846
Predicted Black	0.11	(0.05, 0.18)	<0.001
Predicted Hispanic	-0.25	(-0.38, -0.12)	<0.001
Rent	414.12	(343.81, 484.44)	<0.001
Tenant Representation	-1.56e-03	(-0.05, 0.05)	0.951
Plaintiff Representation	0.17	(0.05, 0.29)	0.005

Appendix Table I3. Compton and Stanley Mosk: Covariate Continuity Checks

Covariate	Robust Estimate	Robust CI	Robust p-value
Total Value (millions)	-1.54	(-2.70, -0.38)	0.009
Taxable Value (millions)	0.28	(9.77e-03, 0.55)	0.042
Female	-100.14	(-216.01, 15.72)	0.090
White	21.11	(-74.16, 116.38)	0.664
Median Income	-3995.03	(-9827.54, 1837.47)	0.179
Predicted White	0.03	(-0.06, 0.11)	0.558
Predicted Female	0.15	(-0.07, 0.36)	0.180
Predicted Black	0.02	(-0.06, 0.10)	0.618
Predicted Hispanic	-0.07	(-0.22, 0.08)	0.341
Rent	9.35	(-67.25, 85.95)	0.811
Tenant Representation	-0.04	(-0.14, 0.06)	0.477
Plaintiff Representation	-0.31	(-0.46, -0.16)	<0.001

Appendix Table I4. Inglewood and Long Beach: Covariate Continuity Checks

Covariate	Robust Estimate	Robust CI	Robust p-value
Total Value (millions)	1.88	(-1.50, 5.26)	0.276
Taxable Value (millions)	3.89	(0.31, 7.46)	0.033
Female	-133.67	(-378.56, 111.23)	0.285
White	-87.27	(-409.91, 235.38)	0.596
Median Income	11853.22	(-11111.09, 34817.52)	0.312
Predicted White	-0.06	(-0.25, 0.12)	0.498
Predicted Female	-0.33	(-0.65, -7.48e-03)	0.045
Predicted Black	0.05	(-0.06, 0.16)	0.395
Predicted Hispanic	-0.02	(-0.28, 0.23)	0.850
Rent	-283.09	(-555.51, -10.67)	0.042
Tenant Representation	0.03	(-0.08, 0.14)	0.557
Plaintiff Representation	-0.04	(-0.18, 0.10)	0.590

Appendix Table I5. Pasadena and Stanley Mosk: Covariate Continuity Checks

Covariate	Robust Estimate	Robust CI	Robust p-value
Total Value (millions)	54.11	(43.31, 64.90)	$<$0.001
Taxable Value (millions)	56.11	(45.33, 66.89)	$<$0.001
Female	-91.89	(-189.05, 5.28)	0.064
White	293.45	(178.03, 408.86)	$<$0.001
Median Income	10747.94	(4044.52, 17451.35)	0.002
Predicted White	0.07	(-0.01, 0.15)	0.095
Predicted Female	-0.14	(-0.26, -0.02)	0.027
Predicted Black	0.02	(-0.03, 0.06)	0.500
Predicted Hispanic	-0.14	(-0.24, -0.05)	0.003
Rent	1021.71	(939.61, 1103.81)	$<$0.001
Tenant Representation	0.04	(-0.02, 0.09)	0.196
Plaintiff Representation	0.05	(-0.03, 0.12)	0.200

Appendix Table I6. Pasadena and West Covina: Covariate Continuity Checks

Covariate	Robust Estimate	Robust CI	Robust p-value
Total Value (millions)	-7.08	(-11.85, -2.31)	0.004
Taxable Value (millions)	-5.12	(-9.70, -0.55)	0.028
Female	47.75	(-90.47, 185.97)	0.498
White	105.85	(-98.25, 309.94)	0.309
Median Income	10772.42	(-8098.26, 29643.10)	0.263
Predicted White	-0.05	(-0.15, 0.04)	0.294
Predicted Female	-0.08	(-0.39, 0.23)	0.617
Predicted Black	-8.17e-03	(-0.06, 0.04)	0.737
Predicted Hispanic	-0.04	(-0.25, 0.18)	0.740
Rent	-3.15	(-252.31, 246.01)	0.980
Tenant Representation	0.08	(-0.06, 0.21)	0.259
Plaintiff Representation	0.09	(-0.03, 0.20)	0.147

Appendix Table I7. Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk: Covariate Continuity Checks

Covariate	Robust Estimate	Robust CI	Robust p-value
Total Value (millions)	-8.95	(-12.81, -5.09)	<0.001
Taxable Value (millions)	-9.14	(-14.95, -3.33)	0.002
Female	88.34	(14.48, 162.19)	0.019
White	37.54	(-62.36, 137.44)	0.461
Median Income	-15918.08	(-23611.12, -8225.05)	<0.001
Predicted White	8.26e-03	(-0.05, 0.06)	0.762
Predicted Female	-0.01	(-0.15, 0.12)	0.863
Predicted Black	0.05	(6.05e-03, 0.09)	0.024
Predicted Hispanic	-0.01	(-0.09, 0.06)	0.707
Rent	-198.54	(-329.45, -67.62)	0.003
Tenant Representation	-0.04	(-0.08, 4.30e-03)	0.080
Plaintiff Representation	-0.04	(-0.08, -3.60e-03)	0.032

Finally, the p-values and bandwidths from McCrary tests on the density of the running variable are shown below, when using the baseline specification sample. Note that these tests use all observations near a courthouse pair spatial boundary.

Appendix Table I8. McCrary / rddensity Tests by Courthouse Pair

Courthouse Pair	Bandwidth Left	Bandwidth Right	Jackknife p-value
Chatsworth and Van Nuys East	930.014	802.089	<0.001
Compton and Norwalk	1535.050	1512.981	0.855
Compton and Stanley Mosk	869.820	1078.225	0.049
Inglewood and Long Beach	961.104	1060.890	<0.001
Pasadena and Stanley Mosk	843.842	1138.083	<0.001
Pasadena and West Covina	1550.607	1157.878	<0.001
Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk	597.778	678.735	0.049

J Appendix J: Additional Robustness Checks

Appendix J includes additional robustness checks for the main RDD LATE estimation and the mechanism model.

J.1 LATE Estimates

This sub-section provides additional robustness checks on the LATE estimates. First, we assess the sensitivity of the LATE estimates to the bandwidth. The dashed vertical lines in each panel are the rdrobust selected bandwidth, whose results are reported in-text as the "Baseline" specification and are reproduced in the lower-right corner of Appendix Figure J1.



Courthouse Pair	LATE Estimate	CI Lower	CI Upper
Chatsworth & Van Nuys East	0.0005	−0.0050	0.0059
Compton & Norwalk	0.0412	0.0191	0.0634
Compton & Stanley Mosk	0.0270	0.0088	0.0451
Inglewood & Long Beach	−0.1334	−0.1837	−0.0832
Pasadena & Stanley Mosk	0.0072	−0.0081	0.0224
Pasadena & West Covina	0.0850	0.0432	0.1267
Santa Monica & Stanley Mosk	0.0289	0.0211	0.0366

Appendix Figure J1. LATE Estimates by Courthouse Pair

Note: The LATE estimates ($\hat{\tau}_C$) at each courthouse pair boundary C are plotted as a function of bandwidth h_x. For each bandwidth h_x, the local linear estimate is plotted along with the CIs (gray ribbon). The table again gives the `rdrobust` package estimates of the LATE, along with the robust CIs. The dashed vertical line is the `rdrobust` optimal bandwidth.

Next, we briefly discuss our similarity score matching procedure to do the "Same Address" (Column (3)) robustness check. The estimates are obtained from excluding cases where the Jaro-Winkler (JW) string similarity score (range 0.0-1.0), which measures differences between the observed address and the assessor address, falls below a similarity threshold (0.88 here). To compute similarity scores we first standardize addresses by turning the assessor and docket addresses to lower case and standardizing certain street naming conventions (e.g. "123 Main Street" becomes "123 Main St"). Then we use the `stringdist::stringsim(method="jw",p=0.1)` function with `method="jw", p=0.1` to compute similarity scores, which uses the Jaro-Winkler method with an increased score for matching characters near the beginning of the string, which gives a higher similarity score if the street numbers match at beginning of docket address and the assessor address. For example, using this procedure the docket address "38059 High County Road Palmdale CA 93551" and the assessor address "38059 High Country Rd Palmdale CA 93551" are recorded as matching addresses with a score of 0.97.



Appendix Figure J2. JW Similarity Scores
Note: The threshold (0.88) for the robustness check is shown as the dashed black vertical line.

J.2 Additional Outcome RDDs: LATE Estimates

Finally, we show additional LATE estimates for further outcome variables.

Additional Outcome LATEs

	(1) Total Time	(2) Time-to-Default (E)	(3) Time-to-Default (L)	(4) Money Judgment
Chatsworth and Van Nuys East				
Mean (1st Court)	270.08	29.61	31.08	1207.35
Mean (2nd Court)	174.83	27.02	29.66	12823.35
Treatment Effect	81.83	1.68	-0.36	-54242.86
95% CI	(-13.18, 176.84)	(-1.38, 4.75)	(-4.56, 3.84)	(-152249.58, 43763.87)
p-value	0.09	0.28	0.87	0.28
Compton and Norwalk				
Mean (1st Court)	137.95	27.41	28.69	1506.83
Mean (2nd Court)	394.69	27.30	27.79	685.10
Treatment Effect	-155.01	-4.21	-3.51	1466.38
95% CI	(-391.30, 81.29)	(-8.44, 0.02)	(-9.77, 2.74)	(331.70, 2601.06)
p-value	0.20	0.05	0.27	0.01
Compton and Stanley Mosk				
Mean (1st Court)	121.54	25.91	26.46	417.86
Mean (2nd Court)	142.38	26.20	27.38	209.54
Treatment Effect	-46.87	2.63	2.08	-160.30
95% CI	(-120.86, 27.12)	(-2.82, 8.08)	(-3.75, 7.91)	(-862.04, 541.44)
p-value	0.21	0.34	0.48	0.65
Inglewood and Long Beach				
Mean (1st Court)	266.55	25.77	27.13	838.90
Mean (2nd Court)	120.04	31.25	31.45	818.59
Treatment Effect	-60.74	0.15	2.72	-1060.75
95% CI	(-265.15, 143.67)	(-9.19, 9.49)	(-7.38, 12.83)	(-2751.98, 630.48)
p-value	0.56	0.97	0.60	0.22
Pasadena and Stanley Mosk				
Mean (1st Court)	172.38	29.59	33.62	432.51
Mean (2nd Court)	203.33	26.29	29.60	768.55
Treatment Effect	-33.65	-0.09	0.71	403.55
95% CI	(-91.68, 24.37)	(-2.90, 2.72)	(-4.70, 6.13)	(-355.42, 1162.53)
p-value	0.26	0.95	0.80	0.30
Pasadena and West Covina				
Mean (1st Court)	293.49	26.84	27.13	1475.27
Mean (2nd Court)	160.17	26.30	28.48	857.56
Treatment Effect	243.42	-4.57	-4.10	-706.73
95% CI	(-241.24, 728.09)	(-10.86, 1.71)	(-10.93, 2.74)	(-2343.50, 930.03)
p-value	0.32	0.15	0.24	0.40
Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk				
Mean (1st Court)	125.11	24.70	26.69	1104.45
Mean (2nd Court)	171.09	27.54	30.18	1363.86
Treatment Effect	-6.86	-5.01	-3.32	-123.51
95% CI	(-76.60, 62.88)	(-7.66, -2.37)	(-8.11, 1.47)	(-1035.12, 788.10)
p-value	0.85	0.00	0.17	0.79

Appendix Table J1. Additional Outcome LATE Estimates

Note: Column (1) uses total case time as the outcome variable. Column (2) use the early-estimated time-to-default measure as the outcome variable. Column (3) uses the late-estimated time-to-default measure as the outcome variable. Column (4) uses total money judgments as the outcome variable. The court means and treatment effects are in days for Columns (1)-(3) and dollars for Column (4).

Other Outcome LATEs (w/covariates)

	(1) Total Time	(2) Time-to-Default (E)	(3) Time-to-Default (L)	(4) Money Judgment
Chatsworth and Van Nuys East				
Bandwidth	978.40	766.04	860.24	2207.82
Number Obs.	2294	1706	1706	1661
Mean (1st Court)	271.40	29.38	30.62	1267.67
Mean (2nd Court)	176.12	27.11	29.92	19761.78
Treatment Effect	92.20	2.33	-0.63	-72042.39
95% CI	(-4.44, 188.83)	(-0.76, 5.43)	(-5.17, 3.92)	(-186854.89, 42770.11)
p-value	0.06	0.14	0.79	0.22
Bonferroni p-value	0.43	0.97	1.00	1.00
Compton and Norwalk				
Bandwidth	1655.79	1114.78	1290.58	1048.52
Number Obs.	2038	1626	1626	1547
Mean (1st Court)	146.99	27.54	28.80	1506.83
Mean (2nd Court)	391.07	27.65	28.07	637.33
Treatment Effect	-169.26	-4.52	-3.75	1312.68
95% CI	(-398.11, 59.59)	(-8.82, -0.22)	(-9.82, 2.31)	(177.71, 2447.65)
p-value	0.15	0.04	0.23	0.02
Bonferroni p-value	1.00	0.27	1.00	0.16
Compton and Stanley Mosk				
Bandwidth	625.63	1099.50	873.66	1086.82
Number Obs.	1905	1474	1474	1374
Mean (1st Court)	117.33	26.74	26.37	391.98
Mean (2nd Court)	156.95	26.01	27.85	206.55
Treatment Effect	-66.73	-0.54	0.56	-113.55
95% CI	(-158.43, 24.97)	(-6.00, 4.91)	(-5.38, 6.49)	(-846.67, 619.57)
p-value	0.15	0.85	0.85	0.76
Bonferroni p-value	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Inglewood and Long Beach				
Bandwidth	895.63	795.68	739.86	992.57
Number Obs.	799	621	621	593
Mean (1st Court)	254.99	26.17	27.30	836.97
Mean (2nd Court)	117.30	31.73	31.78	951.85
Treatment Effect	-12.02	1.60	2.75	-1022.51
95% CI	(-204.04, 180.01)	(-8.21, 11.41)	(-7.76, 13.26)	(-2708.51, 663.49)
p-value	0.90	0.75	0.61	0.23
Bonferroni p-value	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Pasadena and Stanley Mosk				
Bandwidth	1230.69	1328.42	1063.91	739.12
Number Obs.	4899	3551	3549	3187
Mean (1st Court)	166.89	29.75	33.70	427.71
Mean (2nd Court)	199.64	26.40	29.61	803.29
Treatment Effect	-35.42	-0.18	1.91	399.38
95% CI	(-89.13, 18.30)	(-2.96, 2.59)	(-3.66, 7.47)	(-359.33, 1158.08)
p-value	0.20	0.90	0.50	0.30
Bonferroni p-value	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Pasadena and West Covina				
Bandwidth	1747.81	896.54	972.60	890.08
Number Obs.	1020	796	796	736
Mean (1st Court)	274.00	26.81	27.02	1215.22
Mean (2nd Court)	143.85	26.47	28.48	932.49
Treatment Effect	224.52	-4.83	-4.89	-1328.63
95% CI	(-202.93, 651.97)	(-11.77, 2.12)	(-11.88, 2.10)	(-2511.23, -146.04)
p-value	0.30	0.17	0.17	0.03
Bonferroni p-value	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.19
Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk				
Bandwidth	559.26	1147.30	1014.76	1015.48
Number Obs.	5310	3802	3801	3558
Mean (1st Court)	121.64	24.74	25.84	1048.48
Mean (2nd Court)	171.26	27.76	30.66	1342.69
Treatment Effect	-22.13	-5.05	-4.57	-9.32
95% CI	(-81.18, 36.93)	(-7.98, -2.12)	(-8.25, -0.89)	(-893.59, 874.95)
p-value	0.46	0.00	0.02	0.98
Bonferroni p-value	1.00	0.01	0.11	1.00

Appendix Table J2. Additional Outcome LATE Estimates (w/Covariates)

K Appendix K: Mechanism Model

Appendix K includes additional information on the mechanism model, including a simulation example showing how parameter estimates are recovered and additional mechanism model results plots.

K.1 Mechanism Model Simulation

This sub-section simulates a spatial RDD mechanism model compatible with the assumptions made in-text. The goal is to show how heterogeneous segment-specific gaps may be drawn along a boundary, yet common mechanism coefficients like β_D (distance-to-court mechanism coefficient) and β_P (procedure mechanism coefficient) may be recovered. Here, we use A and B to denote two mechanisms in general, but above we are considering the tenant cost mechanism (measured by distance-to-court or generalized costs) and the procedure mechanism.

Suppose there is a single boundary with 50 segments s, with units on each side of the boundary having running variable $X_{is} \sim U[-1, 1]$ and treatment being $W_{is} = \mathbf{1}\{X_{is} \geq 0\}$. Suppose there are two mechanisms A and B of interest and outcome Y, each of which may have segment-specific intercepts and slopes. Accordingly, baseline levels and trends (in X) may vary (continuously) across spatial segments s. Define the following equations for the simulation:

$$A_{is} = \alpha^A_{0s} + \alpha^A_{1s} X_{is} + \Delta A_s * W_{is} + \epsilon^A_{is}$$
$$B_{is} = \alpha^B_{0s} + \alpha^B_{1s} X_{is} + \Delta B_s * W_{is} + \epsilon^B_{is}$$
$$Y_{is} = \alpha^Y_{0s} + \alpha^Y_{1s} X_{is} + \Delta Y_s * W_{is} + \epsilon^Y_{is}$$

The identifying assumption imposed on the model is in how outcome jumps are generated:

$$\Delta Y_s = \beta_A \Delta A_s + \beta_B \Delta B_s + \eta_s$$

which allows for heterogeneity in levels and slopes across segments, but restricts jumps or discontinuities in the outcome variable Y to be caused only by jumps in the mechanisms.

In the simulation that follows, we set $\beta_A = 0.45$ and $\beta_B = -0.35$ with 50 boundary segments and 250 observations per segment, which is similar to the 50 boundary segment specifications run in the actual estimation process. Segment-specific mechanism jumps are drawn from:

$$\Delta A_s \sim N(0.6, 0.35^2) \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta B_s \sim N(0.0, 0.45^2)$$

Segment-specific intercepts and slopes (which vary with X in the DGPs specified above) are drawn iid from normal distributions:

$$\begin{aligned}
\alpha_{0s}^A &\sim N(0.5, 0.5^2) \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha_{1s}^A \sim N(0.2, 0.3^2) \\
\alpha_{0s}^B &\sim N(0.0, 0.7^2) \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha_{1s}^B \sim N(-0.1, 0.3^2) \\
\alpha_{0s}^Y &\sim N(0.2, 0.8^2) \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha_{1s}^Y \sim N(0.15, 0.35^2)
\end{aligned}$$

Epsilon errors in the DGPs are $N(0, 0.15^2)$ for A and B and $N(0, 0.20^2)$ for Y, with further sampling errors $\eta_s \sim N(0, 0.03^2)$. And, as noted above, the outcome jumps are generated according to $\Delta Y_s = \beta_A \Delta A_s + \beta_B \Delta B_s + \eta_s$, so there is additional error in the outcome jump measure (η_s mean zero and independent of the mechanisms).

Using simulated data, we proceed to estimate β_A and β_B in two stages. In the first stage, we estimate segment-specific discontinuities in the mechanism measures around each segment s using bandwidth 0.5. In the second stage, we estimate the β coefficients by regressing across segments the estimated outcome Y gaps on estimated mechanism gaps from stage 1.

The simulation plot below shows how identification from segment variation is possible, even though segments themselves have heterogeneous level and slopes (as a continuous function of X, that is). This means we can recover mechanism coefficients even when levels and slopes are confounded across space, provided the identifying assumptions are satisfied (continuity plus shared mechanism coefficients). Most importantly, this means the outcome gaps must be generated by the structural equation, i.e. only gaps in the two mechanisms cause gaps in the outcome, and other spatial heterogeneity must be a continuous function of X.



Appendix Figure K1. Mechanism Simulation

Note: The simulation uses 50 boundary segments with segment-specific levels and slopes, but common structural coefficients where discontinuities in mechanisms causes discontinuities in outcomes. The top-left panel shows an example segment-specific RDD. The top-right panel illustrates how cross-segment variation in mechanism gaps maps into estimated outcome gaps when the betas are set to true values. Finally, the bottom panels show MC simulation estimate histograms recovering the mechanism beta coefficients: the true coefficients are plotted as solid black vertical lines, whereas the dashed maroon vertical lines are average recovered estimates.

K.2 Reduced Form Results



Appendix Figure K2. Reduced Form Relationships Across Boundary Segments
Note: In the right panel, local linear estimated gaps outside the possible range (-200 to 200) are omitted.

K.3 Generalized Costs

Additional plots on the generalized cost metric as a measure of the tenant cost of getting to court are included below. The first plot shows the positive relationship between generalized cost variable and the distance-to-court variable. The second plot shows generalized costs over time.



Appendix Figure K3. Distance-to-Court and Generalized Cost Relationship
Note: The 1-mile binned averages are shown as points, with a LOESS line of fit in red. The correlation between the measures is shown in the upper-right. All nominal costs are inflation-adjusted to December 2024 dollars using the FRED CPI-U series (CPIAUCSL).



Appendix Figure K4. Generalized Costs Over Time

Note: Monthly average inflation-adjusted costs are shown as points, with a LOESS fit in maroon. Data from the COVID-19 moratoria are unavailable. All nominal costs are inflation-adjusted to December 2024 dollars using the FRED CPI-U series (CPIAUCSL).

K.4 Mechanism Model Estimates: Summary Histograms

This section includes histograms summarizing beta coefficient estimates across specifications. Estimated coefficient histograms for two primary outcome measures (case defaults vs other case outcomes; and imputed defaults) are included in each plot. Average estimates (plotted as vertical black dashed line in each panel), median estimates, and the interquartile range (IQR) are reported in each panel. Some of the plots report coefficient estimates from using the generalized cost measure as our tenant cost variable instead of the distance-to-court measure alone.



Appendix Figure K5. Distribution of Mechanism Beta Estimates (Distance, Standardized)

Note: Each panel reports standardized beta coefficient estimates using two outcome measures (case defaults flags and imputed defaults). Average estimate, median estimate, and IQR are reported in each panel, with the average plotted as the black dashed vertical line. The tenant cost measure used here is the distance-to-court variable.



Appendix Figure K6. Distribution of Mechanism Beta Estimates (Generalized Cost, Non-Standardized)

Note: Each panel reports non-standardized beta coefficient estimates using two outcome measures (case defaults flags and imputed defaults). Average estimate, median estimate, and IQR are reported in each panel, with the average plotted as the black dashed vertical line. The tenant cost measure used here is the generalized cost variable.



Appendix Figure K7. Distribution of Mechanism Beta Estimates (Generalized Cost, Standardized)

Note: Each panel reports standardized beta coefficient estimates using two outcome measures (case defaults flags and imputed defaults). Average estimate, median estimate, and IQR are reported in each panel, with the average plotted as the black dashed vertical line. The tenant cost measure used here is the generalized cost variable.

K.5 Mechanism Model Unweighted Estimates: Summary Histograms

Next, we report histograms of mechanism beta coefficients across models using unweighted linear regressions. The main specifications use a weighted regression, where the weighting comes from the number of observations within the bandwidth near a boundary segment: segments with fewer observations are noisier, so the weighted regressions upweight boundary segments with more observations (larger sample size). However, we also report beta estimates across specifications from unweighted regressions, where each boundary segment contributes equally to the estimation irrespective of local sample sizes.

Four histograms are reported as before, along two dimensions: (1) standardized vs non-standardized estimates, (2) using two tenant cost measures (distance-to-court and generalized cost). Compare, for example, the unweighted and weighted standardized histograms using the distance-to-court tenant cost measure: the average and median estimates in the four panels are roughly unchanged, although the unweighted estimates on the distance-to-court beta (β_D) is slightly larger in magnitude and noisier (wider IQR) in the imputed unit default specifications. Unweighted estimates using the generalized cost measure are similar: the generalized cost betas are different in the imputed unit default specifications (negative to positive), but remain small in standardized terms with larger uncertainty (wider IQR). Weighted vs unweighted regressions in general don't seem to meaningfully affect the case default flag specifications.



Appendix Figure K8. Distribution of Unweighted Mechanism Beta Estimates (Distance-to-Court, Non-Standardized)

Note: Each panel reports non-standardized beta coefficient estimates using two outcome measures (case defaults flags and imputed defaults). Average estimate, median estimate, and IQR are reported in each panel, with the average plotted as the black dashed vertical line. The tenant cost measure used here is the distance-to-court variable. Estimates are from unweighted linear regressions of boundary segment outcome gaps on boundary segment mechanism gaps.



Appendix Figure K9. Distribution of Unweighted Mechanism Beta Estimates (Distance-to-Court, Standardized)

Note: Each panel reports standardized beta coefficient estimates using two outcome measures (case defaults flags and imputed defaults). Average estimate, median estimate, and IQR are reported in each panel, with the average plotted as the black dashed vertical line. The tenant cost measure used here is the distance-to-court variable. Estimates are from unweighted linear regressions of boundary segment outcome gaps on boundary segment mechanism gaps.



Appendix Figure K10. Distribution of Unweighted Mechanism Beta Estimates (Generalized Cost, Non-Standardized)

Note: Each panel reports non-standardized beta coefficient estimates using two outcome measures (case defaults flags and imputed defaults). Average estimate, median estimate, and IQR are reported in each panel, with the average plotted as the black dashed vertical line. The tenant cost measure used here is the generalized cost variable. Estimates are from unweighted linear regressions of boundary segment outcome gaps on boundary segment mechanism gaps.



Appendix Figure K11. Distribution of Unweighted Mechanism Beta Estimates (Generalized Cost, Standardized)

Note: Each panel reports standardized beta coefficient estimates using two outcome measures (case defaults flags and imputed defaults). Average estimate, median estimate, and IQR are reported in each panel, with the average plotted as the black dashed vertical line. The tenant cost measure used here is the generalized cost variable. Estimates are from unweighted linear regressions of boundary segment outcome gaps on boundary segment mechanism gaps.

K.6 Mechanism Model Estimates by Courthouse Pair

Finally, we include detailed tables of mechanism model estimates by courthouse pairs. We include average coefficient estimates from varying specification settings, including: the procedure measure; the outcome measure; the first stage estimation method for the mechanism gaps (local linear vs difference-in-means estimators); bandwidth settings around each segment s; and the number of boundary points sampled along each courthouse pair boundary. Average estimates, median estimates, and median confidence interval widths are included across specifications for both the distance-to-court measure of tenant costs and the generalized cost measure discussed in text.

Chatsworth and Van Nuys East Specifications: distance_to_court

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Distance-to-Court Beta	-6.370e-06	7.810e-07	6.497e-06
procedure_core	Distance-to-Court Beta	-4.031e-06	5.951e-07	1.123e-05
procedure_extended	Distance-to-Court Beta	-7.983e-06	9.360e-07	7.505e-06
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-3.189e-03	-2.173e-03	0.018
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	5.465e-04	-6.324e-04	4.225e-03
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	0.011	3.408e-03	0.050
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Distance-to-Court Beta	4.115e-06	4.126e-06	1.646e-05
imputed_unit_defaults	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.052e-05	-3.216e-07	5.577e-06
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.025	-0.031	0.020
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	0.015	-1.079e-04	0.020
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.406e-05	-1.924e-06	1.810e-05
means	Distance-to-Court Beta	1.800e-06	1.010e-06	5.531e-06
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	0.013	-3.001e-05	0.028
means	Procedure Index Beta	-7.370e-03	-8.283e-04	0.017
Local Bandwidth				
0.5 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-7.523e-06	-2.490e-06	1.197e-05
1 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.153e-05	-1.061e-06	1.123e-05
2 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	1.807e-06	9.691e-07	7.007e-06
0.5 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.012	7.530e-03	0.019
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.031	2.913e-03	0.036
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.013	-2.002e-03	0.018
Boundary Points				
10	Distance-to-Court Beta	1.562e-06	9.240e-07	8.573e-06
20	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.865e-05	6.349e-07	7.247e-06
50	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.504e-06	6.670e-07	5.700e-06
10	Procedure Index Beta	-9.985e-03	-1.470e-03	0.028
20	Procedure Index Beta	0.011	1.179e-03	0.018
50	Procedure Index Beta	6.667e-03	-2.704e-04	0.016

Appendix Table K1. Chatsworth and Van Nuys East (Distance Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is distance-to-court.

Chatsworth and Van Nuys East Specifications: generalized_cost

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Generalized Cost Beta	-3.427e-05	4.273e-05	7.350e-04
procedure_core	Generalized Cost Beta	-5.147e-04	-1.416e-04	7.311e-04
procedure_extended	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.823e-04	-3.171e-05	8.365e-04
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-9.197e-03	-5.685e-03	0.017
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	-3.211e-04	-4.131e-04	4.280e-03
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	-2.972e-03	-7.195e-03	0.049
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.816e-04	-1.583e-04	1.557e-03
imputed_unit_defaults	Generalized Cost Beta	-2.704e-04	-2.074e-05	4.728e-04
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.024	-0.027	0.020
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	4.206e-03	-3.824e-04	0.018
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Generalized Cost Beta	-4.538e-04	-1.385e-04	1.557e-03
means	Generalized Cost Beta	-3.375e-05	-4.192e-06	3.766e-04
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	1.100e-03	-6.986e-04	0.026
means	Procedure Index Beta	-9.427e-03	-8.257e-04	0.016
Local Bandwidth				
0.5 km	Generalized Cost Beta	-2.074e-04	-1.176e-04	2.141e-03
1 km	Generalized Cost Beta	-7.049e-04	-1.736e-04	7.800e-04
2 km	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.925e-05	5.260e-05	6.782e-04
0.5 km	Procedure Index Beta	4.452e-03	3.253e-03	0.017
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.010	-3.844e-04	0.031
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.013	-3.087e-03	0.016
Boundary Points				
10	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.133e-04	-6.692e-05	7.096e-04
20	Generalized Cost Beta	-6.631e-04	-1.587e-04	6.701e-04
50	Generalized Cost Beta	-2.708e-05	8.264e-06	7.486e-04
10	Procedure Index Beta	-0.011	-1.505e-03	0.028
20	Procedure Index Beta	-8.606e-03	-8.257e-04	0.020
50	Procedure Index Beta	4.063e-03	-3.824e-04	0.015

Appendix Table K2. Chatsworth and Van Nuys East (Cost Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is generalized cost.

Compton and Norwalk Specifications: distance_to_court

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Distance-to-Court Beta	5.930e-06	-2.210e-06	1.991e-05
procedure_core	Distance-to-Court Beta	-3.548e-06	-4.240e-06	2.848e-05
procedure_extended	Distance-to-Court Beta	2.784e-06	-2.705e-06	2.143e-05
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	9.850e-03	-0.016	0.035
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	-2.103e-03	-1.032e-03	8.495e-03
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	0.016	-0.027	0.075
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.039e-05	-8.422e-06	2.630e-05
imputed_unit_defaults	Distance-to-Court Beta	1.038e-05	1.505e-06	1.677e-05
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.034	-0.035	0.035
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	0.038	3.613e-03	0.037
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Distance-to-Court Beta	5.617e-06	-2.115e-06	3.241e-05
means	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.172e-06	-2.695e-06	1.690e-05
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	3.953e-03	-2.100e-03	0.043
means	Procedure Index Beta	0.012	-3.932e-03	0.031
Local Bandwidth				
0.5 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	1.569e-05	-9.841e-06	1.295e-04
1 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	7.561e-06	4.906e-06	3.101e-05
2 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-5.470e-06	-3.157e-06	1.131e-05
0.5 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.086	-1.158e-03	0.079
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	7.913e-04	-7.314e-03	0.051
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	7.832e-04	-1.032e-03	0.029
Boundary Points				
10	Distance-to-Court Beta	2.696e-06	-8.236e-07	1.794e-05
20	Distance-to-Court Beta	-6.095e-07	-2.695e-06	2.173e-05
50	Distance-to-Court Beta	3.003e-06	-3.437e-06	2.547e-05
10	Procedure Index Beta	0.015	-1.814e-03	0.034
20	Procedure Index Beta	-3.502e-03	-7.642e-03	0.039
50	Procedure Index Beta	0.013	2.902e-04	0.035

Appendix Table K3. Compton and Norwalk (Distance Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is distance-to-court.

Compton and Norwalk Specifications: generalized_cost

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Generalized Cost Beta	5.313e-04	5.061e-04	2.516e-03
procedure_core	Generalized Cost Beta	-2.667e-04	-1.929e-04	3.526e-03
procedure_extended	Generalized Cost Beta	2.142e-04	4.446e-04	2.368e-03
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	0.011	8.298e-04	0.043
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	-2.580e-03	-1.327e-03	0.011
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	0.018	-3.337e-03	0.077
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.365e-03	-1.087e-03	4.443e-03
imputed_unit_defaults	Generalized Cost Beta	1.248e-03	9.861e-04	1.862e-03
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.033	-0.035	0.042
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	0.039	5.818e-03	0.042
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Generalized Cost Beta	2.687e-04	4.157e-04	3.671e-03
means	Generalized Cost Beta	5.056e-05	-7.328e-05	2.231e-03
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	3.251e-03	-1.995e-03	0.048
means	Procedure Index Beta	0.014	1.015e-03	0.037
Local Bandwidth				
0.5 km	Generalized Cost Beta	8.900e-04	-2.676e-04	5.205e-03
1 km	Generalized Cost Beta	6.698e-04	1.079e-03	3.497e-03
2 km	Generalized Cost Beta	-3.872e-04	-2.697e-04	1.756e-03
0.5 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.084	2.790e-03	0.075
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	-4.768e-04	-7.153e-03	0.058
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	4.090e-03	-5.048e-05	0.026
Boundary Points				
10	Generalized Cost Beta	3.426e-04	4.157e-04	2.740e-03
20	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.481e-04	-7.328e-05	2.476e-03
50	Generalized Cost Beta	2.960e-04	-1.929e-04	3.362e-03
10	Procedure Index Beta	0.019	-7.179e-04	0.039
20	Procedure Index Beta	-2.427e-03	-8.135e-03	0.044
50	Procedure Index Beta	0.012	1.666e-03	0.042

Appendix Table K4. Compton and Norwalk (Cost Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is generalized cost.

Compton and Stanley Mosk Specifications: distance_to_court

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Distance-to-Court Beta	1.046e-05	-2.818e-06	2.552e-05
procedure_core	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.553e-06	-3.663e-06	4.900e-05
procedure_extended	Distance-to-Court Beta	7.148e-06	-2.869e-06	2.751e-05
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-6.308e-03	-0.013	0.031
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	4.508e-03	5.601e-03	0.019
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	-1.006e-03	-0.025	0.064
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Distance-to-Court Beta	-5.087e-06	-4.391e-06	4.014e-05
imputed_unit_defaults	Distance-to-Court Beta	1.400e-05	-1.258e-06	1.725e-05
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.021	-0.026	0.036
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	0.017	5.608e-03	0.032
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Distance-to-Court Beta	1.252e-05	-3.210e-06	3.458e-05
means	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.485e-06	-2.843e-06	2.190e-05
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	5.582e-03	-2.540e-03	0.035
means	Procedure Index Beta	-7.453e-03	1.416e-03	0.032
Local Bandwidth				
0.5 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	4.837e-05	5.065e-06	5.702e-05
1 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-7.675e-06	-5.565e-06	1.874e-05
2 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.720e-06	-2.698e-06	3.236e-05
0.5 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.042	0.017	0.033
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.010	-3.402e-03	0.026
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.010	-8.163e-03	0.044
Boundary Points				
10	Distance-to-Court Beta	4.142e-06	-3.475e-06	2.736e-05
20	Distance-to-Court Beta	6.152e-06	-3.070e-06	2.549e-05
50	Distance-to-Court Beta	4.611e-06	-2.249e-06	2.846e-05
10	Procedure Index Beta	2.303e-03	2.165e-06	0.034
20	Procedure Index Beta	-1.063e-03	-1.415e-03	0.033
50	Procedure Index Beta	-3.507e-03	5.017e-05	0.033

Appendix Table K5. Compton and Stanley Mosk (Distance Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is distance-to-court.

Compton and Stanley Mosk Specifications: generalized_cost

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Generalized Cost Beta	2.252e-04	4.042e-06	3.984e-03
procedure_core	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.088e-03	-8.658e-04	7.767e-03
procedure_extended	Generalized Cost Beta	4.978e-05	-2.432e-04	4.293e-03
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-7.126e-03	-0.017	0.030
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	3.643e-03	5.526e-03	0.021
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	3.972e-03	-0.030	0.055
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Generalized Cost Beta	-5.992e-04	-6.209e-04	6.800e-03
imputed_unit_defaults	Generalized Cost Beta	2.053e-05	-2.620e-04	2.386e-03
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.024	-0.031	0.043
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	0.022	8.342e-03	0.034
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.141e-04	-1.552e-04	5.318e-03
means	Generalized Cost Beta	-4.281e-04	-6.638e-04	3.274e-03
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	5.961e-03	-2.756e-03	0.051
means	Procedure Index Beta	-5.635e-03	5.703e-03	0.030
Local Bandwidth				
0.5 km	Generalized Cost Beta	5.600e-04	3.933e-04	7.536e-03
1 km	Generalized Cost Beta	-9.014e-04	-6.780e-04	4.588e-03
2 km	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.100e-04	-3.402e-04	4.151e-03
0.5 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.046	0.011	0.047
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.012	-3.106e-03	0.027
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-8.002e-03	1.415e-03	0.045
Boundary Points				
10	Generalized Cost Beta	-6.067e-04	-6.939e-04	3.702e-03
20	Generalized Cost Beta	9.594e-06	-1.248e-04	4.325e-03
50	Generalized Cost Beta	-2.721e-04	-4.322e-04	4.639e-03
10	Procedure Index Beta	3.321e-03	2.378e-03	0.033
20	Procedure Index Beta	4.432e-03	-2.780e-04	0.042
50	Procedure Index Beta	-6.737e-03	2.934e-04	0.038

Appendix Table K6. Compton and Stanley Mosk (Cost Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is generalized cost.

Inglewood and Long Beach Specifications: distance_to_court

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Distance-to-Court Beta	1.887e-06	-5.396e-07	2.760e-05
procedure_core	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.597e-05	-1.479e-05	4.485e-05
procedure_extended	Distance-to-Court Beta	1.895e-06	3.067e-07	3.310e-05
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-0.019	-0.029	0.037
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	-5.065e-03	-3.627e-03	9.381e-03
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	-0.030	-0.041	0.125
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Distance-to-Court Beta	-7.112e-06	-1.145e-06	6.432e-05
imputed_unit_defaults	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.621e-06	1.480e-07	1.815e-05
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.026	-0.029	0.036
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	-0.011	9.094e-04	0.043
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Distance-to-Court Beta	-7.335e-06	-1.915e-06	4.851e-05
means	Distance-to-Court Beta	-7.873e-07	3.610e-07	2.094e-05
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	-0.027	-0.029	0.038
means	Procedure Index Beta	-8.962e-03	1.153e-03	0.040
Local Bandwidth				
1 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-6.804e-06	-4.953e-07	5.170e-05
2 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.690e-06	-2.350e-07	2.562e-05
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	5.367e-03	-1.545e-03	0.049
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.030	-0.022	0.034
Boundary Points				
10	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.356e-06	1.536e-06	3.311e-05
20	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.787e-06	-8.832e-07	2.067e-05
50	Distance-to-Court Beta	-5.870e-06	-1.862e-06	3.644e-05
10	Procedure Index Beta	-0.041	-0.024	0.047
20	Procedure Index Beta	-8.339e-03	-3.988e-03	0.037
50	Procedure Index Beta	-0.014	-0.012	0.042

Appendix Table K7. Inglewood and Long Beach (Distance Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is distance-to-court.

Inglewood and Long Beach Specifications: generalized_cost

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Generalized Cost Beta	-2.353e-04	-7.733e-05	3.198e-03
procedure_core	Generalized Cost Beta	6.451e-04	-2.998e-04	4.408e-03
procedure_extended	Generalized Cost Beta	-2.640e-04	-5.330e-04	4.233e-03
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-0.015	-0.025	0.036
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	-5.941e-04	-7.309e-04	7.768e-03
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	-0.015	-0.020	0.093
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Generalized Cost Beta	1.183e-03	7.281e-04	5.690e-03
imputed_unit_defaults	Generalized Cost Beta	-8.590e-04	-1.139e-03	1.733e-03
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.022	-0.023	0.046
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	-3.281e-04	4.251e-04	0.040
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Generalized Cost Beta	5.178e-04	-2.274e-04	5.727e-03
means	Generalized Cost Beta	-4.206e-04	-1.011e-03	1.476e-03
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	-0.018	-0.023	0.054
means	Procedure Index Beta	-2.648e-03	4.313e-04	0.041
Local Bandwidth				
1 km	Generalized Cost Beta	-5.009e-04	-4.694e-04	4.417e-03
2 km	Generalized Cost Beta	3.233e-04	-7.733e-05	3.853e-03
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.012	-1.131e-03	0.056
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.021	-0.011	0.044
Boundary Points				
10	Generalized Cost Beta	5.270e-04	-4.353e-05	7.240e-03
20	Generalized Cost Beta	-4.595e-05	-5.330e-04	2.744e-03
50	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.197e-04	-2.657e-04	3.853e-03
10	Procedure Index Beta	-0.024	-0.011	0.054
20	Procedure Index Beta	1.229e-04	-1.625e-04	0.036
50	Procedure Index Beta	-0.011	-3.488e-03	0.043

Appendix Table K8. Inglewood and Long Beach (Cost Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is generalized cost.

Pasadena and Stanley Mosk Specifications: distance_to_court

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Distance-to-Court Beta	-6.473e-06	-4.865e-06	4.489e-05
procedure_core	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.148e-05	-7.326e-06	4.468e-05
procedure_extended	Distance-to-Court Beta	-8.982e-06	-4.018e-06	5.327e-05
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-0.013	-0.019	0.033
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	5.460e-03	3.322e-03	0.013
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	-0.031	-0.039	0.087
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.402e-06	-3.086e-06	5.718e-05
imputed_unit_defaults	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.424e-05	-7.942e-06	2.240e-05
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.025	-0.028	0.047
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	-3.484e-03	2.393e-03	0.020
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.352e-05	-9.524e-06	6.655e-05
means	Distance-to-Court Beta	-4.431e-06	-3.496e-06	1.799e-05
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	-0.020	-0.012	0.047
means	Procedure Index Beta	-5.759e-03	4.227e-04	0.028
Local Bandwidth				
1 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.359e-05	-9.208e-06	4.681e-05
2 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-6.673e-06	-3.061e-06	4.749e-05
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.022	-8.283e-05	0.032
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-8.515e-03	-5.158e-03	0.042
Boundary Points				
10	Distance-to-Court Beta	-6.054e-07	-3.456e-06	5.786e-05
20	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.720e-05	-5.310e-06	3.192e-05
50	Distance-to-Court Beta	-6.994e-06	-5.376e-06	4.659e-05
10	Procedure Index Beta	-6.161e-03	-5.158e-03	0.055
20	Procedure Index Beta	-0.020	4.837e-04	0.041
50	Procedure Index Beta	-0.011	-1.561e-04	0.031

Appendix Table K9. Pasadena and Stanley Mosk (Distance Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is distance-to-court.

Pasadena and Stanley Mosk Specifications: generalized_cost

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Generalized Cost Beta	-2.102e-04	-4.725e-05	1.407e-03
procedure_core	Generalized Cost Beta	-4.182e-04	-8.877e-05	1.934e-03
procedure_extended	Generalized Cost Beta	-2.010e-04	-8.449e-05	1.695e-03
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-0.010	-0.012	0.027
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	3.894e-03	4.617e-03	0.013
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	-0.027	-0.028	0.059
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.354e-04	2.950e-05	2.384e-03
imputed_unit_defaults	Generalized Cost Beta	-3.893e-04	-1.264e-04	6.789e-04
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.021	-0.023	0.048
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	-3.416e-03	3.272e-03	0.013
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Generalized Cost Beta	-6.553e-04	-5.939e-04	2.212e-03
means	Generalized Cost Beta	1.024e-04	1.092e-04	5.021e-04
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	-0.018	-0.011	0.040
means	Procedure Index Beta	-4.410e-03	2.995e-03	0.017
Local Bandwidth				
1 km	Generalized Cost Beta	-3.838e-04	7.620e-05	2.463e-03
2 km	Generalized Cost Beta	-2.228e-04	-9.999e-05	1.501e-03
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.015	1.168e-03	0.029
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-9.189e-03	3.145e-04	0.025
Boundary Points				
10	Generalized Cost Beta	-3.645e-04	-4.310e-04	2.446e-03
20	Generalized Cost Beta	-3.874e-04	-9.514e-05	1.486e-03
50	Generalized Cost Beta	-1.493e-04	5.111e-06	1.643e-03
10	Procedure Index Beta	-6.741e-03	7.240e-04	0.042
20	Procedure Index Beta	-0.017	8.816e-04	0.028
50	Procedure Index Beta	-8.709e-03	6.274e-04	0.025

Appendix Table K10. Pasadena and Stanley Mosk (Cost Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is generalized cost.

Pasadena and West Covina Specifications: distance_to_court

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.762e-05	-1.408e-05	9.222e-05
procedure_core	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.411e-05	-8.342e-06	9.927e-05
procedure_extended	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.027e-05	-1.618e-05	1.210e-04
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-0.036	-0.019	0.068
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	-2.084e-03	-3.366e-03	0.033
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	-0.110	-0.041	0.161
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.849e-05	-1.927e-05	1.744e-04
imputed_unit_defaults	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.694e-05	-3.397e-06	4.711e-05
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.023	-0.019	0.058
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	-0.058	-8.495e-03	0.109
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Distance-to-Court Beta	-3.537e-05	-3.254e-05	1.322e-04
means	Distance-to-Court Beta	7.028e-07	3.907e-06	2.245e-05
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	-0.087	-0.018	0.292
means	Procedure Index Beta	-0.011	-0.011	0.060
Local Bandwidth				
1 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.177e-05	-3.397e-06	4.711e-05
2 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.919e-05	-1.912e-05	1.242e-04
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.144	-9.952e-04	0.104
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.114	-0.019	0.064
Boundary Points				
20	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.436e-05	-1.044e-05	7.053e-05
50	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.499e-05	-8.342e-06	1.086e-04
20	Procedure Index Beta	-0.260	-0.043	0.101
50	Procedure Index Beta	0.021	-0.011	0.064

Appendix Table K11. Pasadena and West Covina (Distance Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is distance-to-court.

Pasadena and West Covina Specifications: generalized_cost

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Generalized Cost Beta	4.062e-03	2.603e-03	6.178e-03
procedure_core	Generalized Cost Beta	6.076e-03	2.589e-03	6.674e-03
procedure_extended	Generalized Cost Beta	4.264e-03	2.149e-03	6.573e-03
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-8.315e-03	-0.013	0.056
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	3.366e-04	-1.123e-03	0.029
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	-0.019	-0.014	0.153
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Generalized Cost Beta	-2.243e-04	-1.167e-04	4.687e-03
imputed_unit_defaults	Generalized Cost Beta	6.476e-03	3.001e-03	0.012
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.021	-0.020	0.057
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	-4.994e-03	6.796e-04	0.093
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Generalized Cost Beta	7.761e-03	8.287e-03	0.021
means	Generalized Cost Beta	1.840e-03	2.186e-03	1.887e-03
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	-0.014	-5.212e-03	0.235
means	Procedure Index Beta	-4.066e-03	-1.123e-03	0.056
Local Bandwidth				
1 km	Generalized Cost Beta	4.262e-03	2.086e-03	0.030
2 km	Generalized Cost Beta	4.980e-03	2.589e-03	4.687e-03
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.073	5.968e-03	0.107
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.036	-0.012	0.062
Boundary Points				
20	Generalized Cost Beta	8.747e-03	8.347e-03	8.870e-03
50	Generalized Cost Beta	3.485e-03	2.086e-03	6.655e-03
20	Procedure Index Beta	-0.111	-0.019	0.096
50	Procedure Index Beta	0.025	-1.123e-03	0.062

Appendix Table K12. Pasadena and West Covina (Cost Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is generalized cost.

Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk Specifications: distance_to_court

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.360e-06	-4.747e-07	3.186e-05
procedure_core	Distance-to-Court Beta	-4.221e-06	-3.475e-06	5.590e-05
procedure_extended	Distance-to-Court Beta	-5.865e-06	-2.453e-06	3.705e-05
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-0.016	-0.015	0.026
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	4.847e-03	7.360e-04	6.994e-03
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	-0.025	-0.029	0.059
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Distance-to-Court Beta	-1.402e-05	-7.455e-06	4.810e-05
imputed_unit_defaults	Distance-to-Court Beta	2.986e-06	1.665e-06	1.989e-05
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.025	-0.030	0.028
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	-3.666e-03	-5.021e-03	0.019
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Distance-to-Court Beta	-5.204e-06	-5.093e-06	7.085e-05
means	Distance-to-Court Beta	-2.426e-06	-2.049e-06	2.044e-05
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	-0.011	-8.157e-03	0.034
means	Procedure Index Beta	-0.013	-7.862e-03	0.019
Local Bandwidth				
0.5 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-3.740e-05	-3.373e-05	2.083e-04
1 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	1.162e-05	6.527e-06	4.982e-05
2 km	Distance-to-Court Beta	-5.938e-06	-3.928e-06	2.545e-05
0.5 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.039	0.040	0.113
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.021	-7.604e-03	0.031
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.016	-0.011	0.019
Boundary Points				
10	Distance-to-Court Beta	-8.319e-06	2.902e-06	4.191e-05
20	Distance-to-Court Beta	5.512e-06	-1.169e-06	2.071e-05
50	Distance-to-Court Beta	-7.610e-06	-3.928e-06	4.810e-05
10	Procedure Index Beta	-0.013	-8.592e-03	0.022
20	Procedure Index Beta	-0.015	-7.427e-03	0.021
50	Procedure Index Beta	-0.010	-8.485e-03	0.028

Appendix Table K13. Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk (Distance Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is distance-to-court.

Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk Specifications: generalized_cost

	Beta Coefficient	Average Estimate	Median Estimate	Median CI Width
Procedure Spec				
procedure_all	Generalized Cost Beta	3.030e-04	-3.009e-05	1.867e-03
procedure_core	Generalized Cost Beta	5.759e-04	-1.520e-04	3.654e-03
procedure_extended	Generalized Cost Beta	5.035e-04	1.219e-04	2.070e-03
procedure_all	Procedure Index Beta	-0.014	-8.875e-03	0.024
procedure_core	Procedure Index Beta	4.760e-03	-1.815e-04	8.011e-03
procedure_extended	Procedure Index Beta	-0.021	-0.028	0.054
Outcome Spec				
case_default_flag	Generalized Cost Beta	1.838e-03	1.314e-03	3.762e-03
imputed_unit_defaults	Generalized Cost Beta	-4.571e-04	-3.115e-04	1.743e-03
case_default_flag	Procedure Index Beta	-0.029	-0.032	0.029
imputed_unit_defaults	Procedure Index Beta	2.424e-03	-2.294e-03	0.018
First-Stage Method				
local_linear	Generalized Cost Beta	7.980e-04	8.727e-05	3.183e-03
means	Generalized Cost Beta	1.236e-04	-9.926e-05	1.975e-03
local_linear	Procedure Index Beta	-6.241e-03	-7.605e-03	0.034
means	Procedure Index Beta	-0.014	-7.513e-03	0.021
Local Bandwidth				
0.5 km	Generalized Cost Beta	7.946e-05	-6.046e-04	9.838e-03
1 km	Generalized Cost Beta	4.128e-04	-1.284e-04	3.612e-03
2 km	Generalized Cost Beta	5.483e-04	2.596e-04	1.777e-03
0.5 km	Procedure Index Beta	0.046	0.043	0.101
1 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.010	-7.140e-03	0.036
2 km	Procedure Index Beta	-0.020	-0.015	0.018
Boundary Points				
10	Generalized Cost Beta	9.785e-04	4.920e-04	5.710e-03
20	Generalized Cost Beta	4.563e-05	-1.767e-04	2.333e-03
50	Generalized Cost Beta	5.028e-04	-1.069e-04	1.940e-03
10	Procedure Index Beta	-0.021	-9.925e-03	0.023
20	Procedure Index Beta	-9.632e-03	-2.691e-03	0.026
50	Procedure Index Beta	-5.930e-03	-8.548e-03	0.027

Appendix Table K14. Santa Monica and Stanley Mosk (Cost Specifications)
Note: Average non-standardized beta coefficient estimates are given by different specification settings. The measure of tenant costs is these specifications is generalized cost.